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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on macroeconomics of banking and
asset bubbles. In the first chapter, I develop a model to study the production
of private safe assets by the banking sector. In response to a shortage of safe
assets, the banking sector produces more private safe assets which alleviate the
decline of aggregate investment and output. However, producing more private
safe assets exposes the bank to more aggregate risk. Macroprudential policies
can adjust the production of private safe assets with a tradeoff: encouraging
the production of private safe assets alleviates the safe asset shortage problem
and improves output, at the cost of a more volatile economy.
In the second chapter, I document that during the 2008 financial crisis,
U.S. shadow banks deleveraged sharply while commercial banks maintained
their leverage. I find that banks that relied more on short-term wholesale
funding tended to deleverage more during the crisis. I then build a model to
incorporate both shadow banks and commercial banks with different leverage
determination mechanisms. The model can explain the heterogeneous leverage
dynamics of the banking sector and the flight-to-quality phenomenon observed
in data.
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The third chapter is coauthored with Jianjun Miao and Pengfei Wang. We
revisit Gaĺı (2014) analysis by extending his model to incorporate persistent
bubble shocks. We find that, under adaptive learning, a stable bubbly steady
state and the associated sunspot solutions under optimal monetary policy
are not E-stable. When deriving the unique forward-looking minimum stable
variable (MSV) solution around an unstable bubbly steady state, we obtain
results that are consistent with the conventional views: leaning against the
wind policy reduces bubble volatility and is optimal. Such a steady state and
the associated MSV solution are E-stable.
vii
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Chapter 1
Production of Private Safe Assets and
Macroprudential Policy
1.1 Introduction
Safe assets are assets whose values are insensitive to aggregate shocks (Ca-
ballero et al., 2017), for example, the U.S. government bonds. The financial
sector also issues private safe assets including bank deposits and many high-
quality securities. Nevertheless, the U.S. economy experienced a shortage of
safe assets in the 2000s (Caballero and Farhi, 2018). Many researchers ar-
gue that the supply of U.S. safe assets did not catch up with the increasing
demand for safe assets from emerging economies, or the ‘global saving glut’
(Bernanke et al., 2005; Caballero et al., 2017; Caballero, 2009). Savings from
foreign countries demanded an increasing amount of U.S. safe assets, mostly
U.S. government bonds, drove down the interest rate, and left less safe assets
remaining for other investors. In response to the shortage of safe assets, the
U.S. banking sector manufactured a large amount of private safe assets. In
the years before the financial crisis, banks issued short-term ‘money like’ li-
abilities that were perceived as safe assets by investors through the process
called securitization (Sunderam, 2015). It was widely believed that the rapid
growth of securitization and related banking activities led to the 2008 financial
crisis. Despite some empirical evidence showing that the production of private
2
safe assets responded to the degree of safe assets shortage (Kacperczyk et al.,
2017), its economic consequences and policy implications are understudied.
In this chapter, I build a general equilibrium model with a banking sector
to study the interaction between the shortage of safe assets and the produc-
tion of private safe assets. In the model, the bank issues private safe assets
against assets that are subject to aggregate shocks. The private safe assets
are demanded by both entrepreneurs and a representative household. The en-
trepreneurs make capital investments with idiosyncratic investment efficiency
shocks and thus demand private safe assets as a store of value. The household
holds private safe assets for its liquidity service.
I model the shortage of safe assets by an exogenous increase in the demand
for safe assets from the household. An increase in the demand for safe assets
induces the household to hold more safe assets, intensifies the competition for
safe assets between entrepreneurs and the household and leads to a shortage
of safe assets. The price of the private safe assets rises and the return falls.
The entrepreneurs have to accept a lower return for holding the private safe
assets. As a result, the entrepreneurs’ wealth shrinks, and investment and
output fall. My model illustrates that the shortage of safe assets hampers the
safe asset’s function as a store of value and reduces output through the wealth
of the entrepreneurs.
In the model, the bank invests in both safe and risky projects and uses
their cash flows to issue private safe assets. The safe projects pay a non-
stochastic return and its supply is limited. The return of risky projects is
subject to aggregate shocks but the supply is unlimited. The shortage of
safe assets lowers the return of the private safe assets and increases the profit
margin of the bank. The bank responds by expanding its balance sheet and
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producing more private safe assets. Since the supply of the safe projects is
limited, the bank has to invest in more risky projects and thus exposes itself
to more aggregate risk. A negative aggregate shock deteriorates the bank’s
balance sheet, hinders its production of private safe assets, and thus leads to
a shortage of safe assets and lower investment and output.
The expansion of the bank’s balance sheet alleviates the shortage of safe as-
sets by providing more private safe assets. However, such an expansion exposes
the economy to more aggregate risk. Therefore a negative aggregate shock has
a larger impact on the economy when the bank is larger. Macroprudential
policies can be useful to restrict the production of private safe assets and the
bank’s risk exposure. It is widely recognized that the financial crisis was origi-
nated from the U.S. shadow banking sector. If macroprudential policies could
restrict the size of the bank’s balance sheet and reduce the associated risk, the
crisis could be mitigated. However, restricting the production of safe assets
intensifies the shortage of safe assets and lowers output. Thus macropruden-
tial policies face a tradeoff: encouraging the bank to produce more private safe
assets alleviates the shortage of safe assets and improves output, at the cost of
a more risky banking sector and a more volatile economy. The optimal level
of the macroprudential policy depends on the variance of the aggregate shock
and the severity of the safe asset shortage.
Related literature. My paper is related to several strands of literature.
First is the literature on the shortage of safe assets (Caballero, 2006; Caballero
and Farhi, 2018; Caballero et al., 2017, 2008; Caballero, 2009). My paper is
closest to the idea of Caballero (2009). They argue that when the economy has
a shortage of safe assets driven by foreign capital inflows, the domestic financial
sector has a higher leverage and is exposed to more risks when producing more
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safe assets. My paper contributes to this literature by explicitly studying how
private safe assets are produced by the banking sector in the environment of
safe asset shortage and analyzing macroprudential policies.
Secondly, my paper is related to the large banking literature that also em-
phasizes the tradeoff between economic growth and financial stability (Moreira
and Savov, 2017; Gertler et al., 2020; Stein, 2012; Gennaioli et al., 2013). In
this literature, usually the benefit of banks credit expansion is to intermediate
more funds to the borrower and hence increases investment. My paper con-
tributes to this literature by providing a new channel through which a credit
expansion can benefit the economy, that is to produce more safe assets as
saving instruments to benefit the saver, rather than the borrower.
Thirdly, my paper is related to the literature of rational bubbles (Farhi
and Tirole, 2012; Miao and Wang, 2018; Hirano and Yanagawa, 2016). As-
set bubbles can often exist in economies short of assets. For example, Aoki
et al. (2014) show that a shortage of safe assets can create conditions for
intrinsically useless ‘safe’ bubble assets to circulate at a positive price. In
my paper, the banking sector produces private safe assets backed by risky
projects. It depicts the securitization business of the U.S. shadow banking
sector where banks issued asset-backed commercial papers against mortgage-
backed-securities (MBS). These MBS were further backed by the high hous-
ing prices, which were believed to contain bubbles before the financial crisis.
Hence the production of private safe assets shares similarities with the for-
mation of bubbles. I borrow the model setup from the bubble literature that
entrepreneurs face uninsurable investment efficiency shocks to generate the
need for safe assets (Dong et al., 2020; Hirano et al., 2015).
Lastly, my paper is related to the empirical evidence that the financial
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sector produces more private safe assets in response to safe asset shortages.
Sunderam (2015) shows that the sustained increase in money demand could
explain up to 50% of the growth in asset-backed commercial papers (ABCP)
in the years before the financial crisis. Kacperczyk et al. (2017) find that the
issuance of short-term certificates of deposits strongly responds to measures of
safety demand. Xie (2012) finds that ABS/MBS issuers react to the change in
the convenience yield, which is a measure of safe asset shortage. Nadauld and
Sherlund (2013) show that the securitization activities of investment banks af-
fect the upstream mortgage origination business. My model is consistent with
the empirical findings of this literature and provides a theoretical explanation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents some
motivating facts on the shortage of safe assets and the production of private
safe assets by the U.S. shadow banking sector. Section 1.3 introduces the
model. Section 1.4 uses the model to study the effects of safe asset shortages
due to both structural forces and aggregate shocks. Section 1.5 then analyzes
macroprudential policies. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Safe Asset Shortage and Shadow Banking
The U.S. economy experienced a shortage of safe assets in the early 2000s.
Figure 1·1 shows the convenience yield, which is the spread between the yield
of AAA corporate bond and the long-term treasury yield (Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012). Investors hold safe assets as a store of value and
are willing to accept lower returns for their safety and liquidity, so safe assets
enjoy a convenience yield. The convenience yield is a useful measure of safe
asset shortage. When there is a shortage of safe assets, the price of safe assets
goes up and the return goes down, hence the convenience yield will go up. The
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convenience yield rose in the late 1990s and early 2000s, suggesting a shortage
of safe assets. The shortage was then mitigated from 2003 to 2006, and then
worsened again during the crisis. Shortages of safe assets were also likely to
be associated with lower investment and output since they coincided with the
recent two recessions. Although not causal, this relation is consistent with the
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Figure 1·1: Convenience Yield
Many factors could drive such a shortage of safe assets, for example the
large foreign capital inflows from emerging countries that purchased a lot of
U.S. government bonds and hence resulted a shortage of safe assets. In this
paper, I do not ask what exactly caused the shortage of safe assets, but take
it as given and focus on the response of the U.S. banking sector. Following
the shortage of safe assets in the early 2000s, the U.S. shadow banking sector
grew rapidly. In the years before the 2008 financial crisis. the banking sector
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manufactured a large amount of private safe assets through the process called
‘structured finance’ or ’securitization’ (Coval et al., 2009). In the securitization
business, financial institutions bought a bunch of risky assets, pooled them
together, and then used their cash flows to create asset-backed-securities (ABS)
or mortgage-backed-securities (MBS) if the underlying assets were mortgages.
The issuer, often a large investment bank, then financed these ABS with short-
term liabilities. In doing so, the issuer bank first created a special-purpose-
entity (SPE) and sold the ABS to it. The SPE then issued short-term liabilities
to the final investors in the form of asset-backed commercial papers (ABCP).
The SPE was off the balance sheet of the issuer bank and was outside the
normal banking regulation. That’s why the whole process was called shadow
banking.
Figure 1·2 presents the amount of issuance of non-agency (private-label)
MBS and the amount of outstanding ABCP. MBS was the most important
type of assets under securitization and they accounted for more than half of the
total ABS outstanding (Gorton and Metrick, 2013). The issuance of private-
label MBS grew from a few hundred billion dollars in 2000 to almost 1500
billion dollars at the peak of 2006. In the meantime, the ABCP outstanding
grew from a little more than 600 billion dollars in the early 2000s to 1200
billion dollars on the eve of the financial crisis. This period of rapid expansion
of securitization matches the same period in Figure 1·1 when the safe asset
shortage was mitigated. So it’s likely that the rapid growth of the securitization
business and the production and the production of private safe assets partially
filled up the gap of safe asset shortage in the U.S.
However, unlike public safe assets, the production of private safe assets
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Asset-backed-commercial-papers
Mortgage-backed-securities
Figure 1·2: ABCP Outstanding and MBS Issuance
expanded so quickly, the economy could not provide enough good assets to be
securitized in the short-run. As a result, the shadow banking sector inevitably
looked for more risky assets, and most notably, subprime mortgages. Figure
1·3 shows that the ratio of subprime MBS over total private-label MBS in-
creased from 30% to more than 60% in the same period. When the shadow
banking sector was searching for more mortgages for securitization, the mort-
gage originators in the upstream was incentivized to lower the lending standard
and conduct subprime lending more aggressively. The whole financial system
was exposed to more risk.
Although the underlying assets were risky, the issuer bank would usually
apply credit enhancements so that the SPE could issue safe liabilities. For
instance, the issuer bank could sell the ABS in tranches with different senior-
ity. It could also provide explicit and implicit guarantees to the SPE (Acharya
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Figure 1·3: Ratio of Subprime MBS over Total MBS
and purchased mainly by money market funds and pension funds. The spread
of ABCP over Fed Fund Rate was only a few basis points before the financial
crisis. Sunderam (2015) provided empirical evidence that investors treated
short-term debt issued by shadow banks (ABCP) as a money-like claim, sup-
porting the argument that the rising demand for safe assets contributed to the
growth of the U.S. shadow banking sector before the financial crisis.
In summary,in response to the shortage of safe assets in the early 2000s,
the U.S. banking sector was able to produce a large amount of private safe
assets against risky collaterals, which alleviated the safe asset shortage but
also exposed the banking sector to higher risk. Finally, when the financial
crisis came, the private safe assets lost their value, which led to the acute
shortage of safe assets and the spike in the convenience yield.
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1.3 A Model of Safe Asset Production
In this section, I present a model of private safe asset production. The model
consists of a continuum of entrepreneurs, a banking sector, a representative
household, and competitive final-good producers. Entrepreneurs make capital
investments. They are subject to idiosyncratic investment efficiency shocks
and thus demand private safe assets provided by the bank as a store of value.
The bank issues private safe assets by investing in various projects. The house-
hold also holds private safe assets for its liquidity service. Final-good produc-
ers combine capital provided by the entrepreneurs and labor provided by the
household to produce consumption goods.
1.3.1 Entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by j and the measure is normal-
ized to one. Entrepreneurs can produce new capital goods with idiosyncratic
investment efficiencies:
knjt+1 = ajtijt, (1.1)
where the ijt and k
n
jt+1 are the amount of investment input and new capital
produced. ajt represents the idiosyncratic investment efficiency of entrepreneur
j. The entrepreneur then sells the new capital to the final-good producers in
the next period at the price qt+1.
The idiosyncratic investment efficiency ajt can be either high or low: ajt ∈
{aH , aL}. In each period, a fraction h of entrepreneurs receive high investment
efficiency, while the rest 1− h entrepreneurs receive low investment efficiency:
Pr(ajt = a
H) = 1− Pr(ajt = aL) = h.
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The idiosyncratic investment efficiency is i.i.d. across time and the entrepreneurs.
For simplicity, I call an entrepreneur the ‘high type’ (‘low type’) if he receives
high (low) investment efficiency.
Besides capital investment, entrepreneurs can purchase private safe assets
provided by the bank. The private safe asset pays a non-stochastic return Rt.
In equilibrium, the low type entrepreneurs have inferior investment efficiency
and thus need to hold the private safe assets as a store of value. Let njt and
sEjt denote entrepreneur j’s net wealth and the amount of private safe assets
purchased by entrepreneur j. The balance sheet of entrepreneur j is
ijt + s
E
jt = njt. (1.2)
I assume that in each period the entrepreneur pays out 1 − σE of the total
revenue as dividends to the household
divEjt+1 = (1− σE)(qt+1knjt+1 +RtsEjt).












subject to (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3). β is the discount rate.
1.3.2 Bank
The bank issues private safe assets, which are the bank’s liabilities and the
assets of the entrepreneurs and the household. The private safe assets pay a
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non-stochastic gross return Rt. In order to issue private safe assets, the bank
invests in a pool of projects as its assets. Every project requires one unit of
funding. There are two types of projects: safe and risky. A safe project pays
a fixed gross return of RX and the total amount of investable safe projects
is limited at G. The return of a risky project is RXZt where Zt is a random
variable describing the aggregate return shock and its mean is one E(Zt) = 1.
The amount of investable risky projects is unlimited. The bank always invests
in the safe projects first and then serve the risky projects.
Let Xt denote the total number of projects the bank invests on its asset
side. I assume that Xt > G so that all the safe projects are served and the
bank invests at least in some risky projects. The bank uses the cash flow
from the project pool to issue private safe assets. Suppose the bank issues St
amount of private safe assets. The discrepancy between the size of the project
pool and the amount of private safe assets issued must be funded by the bank’s
own equity Wt. The balance sheet of the bank is
Xt = St +Wt. (1.5)
Note that the asset of the bank is exposed to aggregate risk while the
liability is not. The bank effectively uses its equity to absorb the aggregate
risk on its asset side and ensures its liability is indeed safe. To ensure the safety
of its liability, the bank has to hold enough equity as buffer stocks so that it
can honor the promised payments on the private safe assets. In particular, I
assume the bank is facing a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint:
(Xt −G)ZRX +GRX ≥ StRt. (1.6)
The VaR constraint says that the bank can guarantee the payments of the
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private safe assets whenever the aggregate shock on the return of its risky
project is above a cutoff Z. For example, if Z is the 1% lowest realization
of the distribution of Zt, then the above constraint ensures that the bank
can honor its liability 99% of the time. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
documented that the VaR constraint applies to broadly the shadow banking
sector.
The bank maximizes the discounted stream of dividends paid back to the
household. For simplicity, I assume that the bank follows a constant dividend
payout policy similar to the entrepreneurs. In each period a fraction 1 − σB
of the bank’s current revenue is paid out as dividends.
divBt+1 = (1− σB)((Xt −G)Zt+1RX +GRX − StRt).
The bank’s next period’s equity is accumulated through retained earnings
Wt+1 = σ
B((Xt −G)Zt+1RX +GRX − StRt). (1.7)
The bank’s objective is to maximize the expected sum of future dividends




subject to (1.5), (1.6) and (1.7).
1.3.3 Final-Good Producers
Competitive final-good producers use capital and labor to produce consump-







The final goods producers keep the stock of capital, which depreciates at a
rate δ. The final-good producers can purchase new capital Knt from the en-
trepreneurs at price qt to replenish the capital stock:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +Knt , (1.10)
The final-good producers maximize the sum of discounted profits by choosing






βt(Yt − wtLt − qtKnt )
where β is the discount rate of the household. The final-good producers then
rebate their profits to the household
Πt = Yt − wtLt − qtKnt . (1.11)
1.3.4 Households
The representative household supplies one unit of labor inelastically and earns
a wage wt. He consumes Ct and purchases private safe assets S
H
t produced by
the bank. His budget constraint is thus









is the dividends paid out from the entrepreneurs and the bank.
To incorporate exogenous shifts in the demand for safe assets and model the
shortage of safe assets, I assume that the household values a ‘liquidity service’
from the private safe assets Sunderam (2015). In particular, the household
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βt(lnCt + Ft lnS
H
t )
subject to (1.12), where lnSHt is the liquidity service from holding the safe
assets. The welfare weight on the liquidity service Ft captures the demand for
safe assets from the household, which broadly reflects the society’s appetite for
safe assets. An increase in Ft can capture, for example, an increase in foreign
capital inflows pursuing safe U.S. assets. It can also reflect more structural
forces, such as an increase in savings due to population aging.
1.3.5 Equilibrium Definition
Given the exogenous processes for Zt and Ft, a competitive equilibrium is
defined as the paths of variables {njt, ijt, sEjt, Xt, St, Wt, Yt, Lt, Kt, Knt ,
Ct, S
H
t , qt, wt, Rt} such that i) the entrepreneurs, the bank, the final-good
producers and the household optimize subject to the relevant constraints; ii)
the aggregate variables follows (1.7), (1.9), (1.10), (1.11) and Lt = 1; iii) all










1.3.6 Equilibrium Characterization and Aggregation
In this subsection, I discuss the optimal actions for different players in the
model. The entrepreneurs choose between capital investment and holding
private safe assets. The expected return of capital investment is ajtEtqt+1
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while the return of holding private safe assets is Rt. Since the entrepreneurs
maximize the discounted sum of wealth given the constant dividends payout
policy, the entrepreneurs will choose whichever asset that gives a higher return.
I focus on the equilibrium where the high type entrepreneurs choose capital
investment while the low type entrepreneurs choose to hold private safe assets
(see Appendix A for a formal proof). This requires that
Assumption 1.1. The return of safe assets is between the return of capital
investment for the low-type and the high-type entrepreneurs
aLEtqt+1 < Rt < a
HEtqt+1.
Without loss of generosity, I assume aH = 1 and aL = 0 since only the
value of aHEtqt+1 is determined in the equilibrium.
I also show in Appendix A that as long as the bank is earning a positive
profit margin, it wants to expand its balance sheet as much as possible and
hence the VaR constraint is binding:
(Xt −Ng)ZRX +NgRX − StRt = 0. (1.13)
Assumption 1.2. The bank’s profit margin is positive in the equilibrium
EtZt+1R
X −Rt > 0.
Under Assumption 1.2 and given the level of the bank’s equity Wt, the
bank will produces as much private safe assets St as possible until the VaR
constraint binds.










njt denote the aggregate investment, aggregate holdings
of private safe assets by the entrepreneurs and the aggregate wealth of the
entrepreneurs. Using the optimal actions for the two type of entrepreneurs, I
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obtain
It = hNt, (1.14)
SEt = (1− h)Nt. (1.15)
The amount of new capital follows
Knt+1 = It. (1.16)















Equation (1.5), (1.7) and (1.13) describe the equilibrium behavior of the bank.






t + β(1− δ)Etqt+1, (1.19)
wt = (1− α)Kαt L−αt . (1.20)








The equilibrium system in aggregate variables consists of 14 endogenous
variables {Yt, Ct, Kt, Knt , It, Nt, Wt, Xt, St, SHt , SEt , qt, wt, Rt} and 14 equa-
tions: (1.5), (1.7), (1.9), (1.10), (1.12), (1.13), (1.14), (1.15), (1.16), (1.17),
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(1.18), (1.19), (1.20), (1.21). The full equilibrium system is presented in the
Appendix A.
1.3.7 Wealth Channel of Safe Assets Shortage
How does a shortage of safe assets affect the economy? The degree of the
shortage of safe assets can be measured by the convenience yield of the safe
assets. The higher the convenience yield, the more severe the shortage of safe
assets. In the model, the convenience yield can be represented by the difference
between the return of capital investment and the return of safe assets:
CYt ≡ Etqt+1aH −Rt.
I show that in the steady state, the output is decreasing in the convenience
yield.
Proposition 1.1. In the steady state, ∂Y/∂CY < 0.
This result shows that a shortage of safe assets has a negative effect on
output. The intuition is that a shortage of safe assets pushes down the return
of the private safe assets Rt. Since the entrepreneurs need to hold the private
safe assets as a store of value, a lower return reduces their wealth. As the
entrepreneurs have less wealth for investment, capital stock and output fall.
This is the key mechanism in the model through which the amount of safe
assets affects the real economy. Since it works through the wealth of the
entrepreneurs, I call it the ‘wealth channel’. This mechanism is similar to




A key point to emphasize is that in the model, the bank does not actually create
safe assets, but uses its own equity to absorb the variations in its profits so
that all the aggregate risk is concentrated in its equity. This setup shares some
similarities with Caballero (2009). Acharya et al. (2013) provide empirical
evidence that the bank was doing a securitization without risk transfer before
the financial crisis. The idea is that banks provided both implicit and explicit
guarantee to their securitization products, so that ex-post it was the bank,
not the external investors, bore the loss due to default the subprime mortgage
and subprime MBS. My model is consistent with these views. In another
perspective, the private safe assets the bank issued is only ‘internally’ safe,
in the sense that it is safe only to the holder. As a whole economy, however,
more private safe assets implies more aggregate risk exposure. The truly safe
assets in the economy are the safe projects invested by the bank, whose supply
is fixed. This is similar to Caballero and Farhi (2018) where the net supply of
safe assets is zero.
1.4 Model Performance
In this section, I show that the model can capture the empirical facts about the
safe asset shortage presented in Section 2. I solve the model using perturbation
around the static steady state. I first describe the calibration of the model.
1.4.1 Calibration
Table 1.1 shows the parameter values of the model. The model is highly
stylized to study the effects of the shortage of safe assets. The risky and safe
projects invested by the bank represent prime and subprime MBS. I set their
20
mean return RX = 1.035 to match the annualized return of the S&P U.S.
MBS index. I set the total supply of safe projects G at 1. This implies the
ratio of risky projects over total projects is around 30% to 70%, consistent
with the ratio of subprime MBS over total private-label MBS observed in the
data. The utility weight on liquidity service, F , is set at 0.015, which implies
the spread between the return of safe assets and the required return due to
impatience 1/β is 173 basis point. This is comparable to the spread between
the return of treasury bonds and the return of triple-A corporate bonds in
the early 2000s. I set σE and σB at 0.95 and 0.75 respectively, which implies
a 5% dividends payout ratio for the entrepreneurs and 25% for the bank. I
set the cutoff value of the aggregate return shock Z used in the bank’s VaR
constraint at 0.75, which is the lowest 1% realization given the distribution
of Zt. Under the above calibration, the steady state leverage of the bank is
around 10. The capital depreciation is set at 0.025. The capital share is set at
0.3. The discount rate of the household is set at 0.99. These parameter values
are standard in the business cycle literature.
I assume the aggregate shock of the return of risky projects Zt has a left-
skewed distribution. In particular, I assume that
Zt = −Paexp(−Pbxt) + Pc,
where xt follows an AR1 process
xt = ρxxt−1 + εx
and εx is the normal innovation with standard deviation σx. I set Pa = 0.1,
Pb = 0.55, and Pc = 1.1. This implies that the mean of the aggregate return
shock Zt is one and its skewness is around -0.0114. I set the autocorrelation
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of xt at 0.6 and the standard deviation σx at 1.2, which in turn implies the
autocorrelation of Zt is around 0.637 and the standard deviation is around
8.5%. To have a reference, the annualized standard deviation of the return of
the S&P U.S. MBS index is 2.25% (calculated from 2014 to 2020). The size of
the shock matters for the welfare analysis. I choose a relatively larger shock to
mimic large negative events like the financial crisis. The focus of the model is
more on qualitative results rather than quantitative ones and the main results
are not sensitive to the value of parameters.
Parameter Value Target/Source
RX 1.035 Return of S&P U.S. MBS index
G 1 Ratio of subprime MBS over total MBS
std(Zt) 8.5% Std of return of S&P U.S. MBS index is 2.5%
F 0.015 Convenience yield of 173 basis point
σE 0.95 Entrepreneurs’ dividend payout ratio 5%
σB 0.75 Bank’s dividend payout ratio 25%
Z 0.75 Leverage of the bank is around 10
h 0.4 Hirano, Inaba, and Yanagawa, 2015
δ 0.025 Depreciate rate of capital
α 0.3 Capital share
β 0.99 Discount rate
Table 1.1: Benchmark Calibration
1.4.2 Shortage of Safe Assets by Structural Forces
The U.S. economy experienced a shortage of safe assets in the early 2000s,
which is followed by a rapid expansion of the shadow banking sector. In
the first experiment, I show that my model can replicate such a shortage of
safe assets by a permanent increase in the demand for safe assets from the
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household Ft. In particular, I assume that Ft follows a slow-moving AR1
process
Ft − F = ρF (Ft−1 − F )
with ρF = 0.9. I simulate the model with a permanent increase in the steady
state value F from 0.0005 to 0.015. Figure 1·4 shows the transition path of
the model economy.






























































































































Figure 1·4: Transition Path under A Permanent Increase in
the Demand for Safe Assets
The increase in the demand for safe assets F intensifies the competition
for safe assets between the entrepreneurs and the household, generating a safe
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asset shortage reflected by a declining return of safe assets and an increasing
convenience yield. The shortage of safe assets affects the aggregate output
through the wealth of the entrepreneurs, or the ‘wealth channel’. A lower
return of the private safe asset hampers its function as a store value. The
entrepreneurs have to accept a lower return for holding the private safe assets
so their wealth shrinks. As the entrepreneurs have less wealth, they spend
less on capital investment, and hence the output falls. The output drops
about 1% under the model calibration. In the meantime, the bank responds
by expending its balance sheet to produce more private safe assets since the
bank’s profit margin is now higher. The volume of the private safe assets
increased by more than 50%. When producing more private safe assets, the
bank also expands its assets by investing in more risky projects. The ratio of
risky projects over total projects increased from 40% to 60%, which reflects
the change in the ratio of subprime MBS over total private-label MBS before
the financial crisis.
In summary, the model successfully captures the empirical facts about
the safe asset shortage the U.S. economy experienced in the early 2000s. The
model also suggests that the shortage of safe assets was responsible for the rise
of the banking sector. One thing to note is that an increase in the demand
for safe assets is not the only possible reason for the shortage of safe assets.
In the Appendix A, I show that a worsening of investment opportunities for
the entrepreneurs, modeled as a decrease in h, can also generate a shortage of
safe assets with similar patterns: a rising convenience yield, a larger banking
sector, and a lower output.
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1.4.3 Shortage of Safe Assets by Negative Shocks
The bank produces private safe assets against risky projects. Hence aggregate
shocks on the return of risky projects affect the balance sheet of the bank
and its ability to produce private safe assets. Figure 1·5 shows the impulse
response of the model economy to a negative shock on the return of risky
projects Zt. Under the current calibration, a one standard deviation negative
shock reduces the return of risky projects by 6%. The equity of the bank
shrinks by 25% and the production of private safe assets falls by 8%. This
generates a mild shortage of safe assets and the convenience yield rises by 2%.
The shortage of safe assets then affects the real economy negatively through
the ‘wealth channel’. The entrepreneurs’ wealth shrinks by 2% and the output
falls by 0.15%.
The model shows that a negative shock deteriorates the bank’s balance
sheet, reduces the production of private safe assets, and affects the output neg-
atively through its function as a store of value. The negative aggregate shock
resembles the 2007 subprime crisis. The financial crisis was originated from
the increasing default rate in the subprime mortgages and the consequent de-
teriorations of the subprime mortgage-backed-securities (Brunnermeier, 2009).
Many financial institutions suffered large losses. The bankruptcy of the two
hedge funds of the investment bank Bear Stearns in the summer of 2007 trig-
gered the collapse of the ABCP market. The value of ABCP outstanding fell
by 33% within one month (Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2010). The collapse of
the ABCP market greatly reduced the supply of private safe assets, causing
an acute shortage of safe assets (Caballero et al., 2017). Hence, besides its
various negative effects through different channels, my model implies that the
financial crisis led to an additional reduction in output by intensifying the safe
25































































































































Figure 1·5: Impulse Response to an Aggregate Shock on the
Return of Risky Projects
asset shortage problem and reducing the entrepreneurs’ wealth.
1.4.4 Shortage of Safe Assets and Risk Exposure
Since a shortage of safe assets stimulates a larger banking sector with more
risky projects on its balance sheet, an aggregate shock on the return of risky
projects Zt will have a larger impact when the shortage of safe assets is more
severe. Figure 1·6 shows the impulse response of output to a one standard
deviation negative aggregate shock under different values of F , the demand
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for safe assets from the household. Small, medium and large F correspond
to values of 0.0005, 0.005, and 0.01. A higher value of F means a higher
demand for safe assets and hence a more severe shortage of safe assets. The
figure shows that the negative effect of the aggregate shocks Zt of the same
size is larger when the shortage of safe assets is more severe. The main reason
for this variation is that as the shortage of safe assets gets more severe, the
bank is producing more private safe assets to cater to the higher demand and
conducting more risky projects. The bank’s risk exposure, measured by the
ratio of risky projects over total projects (Xt−G)/Xt is increasing in F . Hence,
the economy is more exposed to the aggregate shock and its negative effect is
larger.























Figure 1·6: Impulse Responses of Output to Shocks on Return
of Risky Projects under Different Severity of Safe Asset Shortage
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My model suggests that to some extent, the shortage of safe assets in the
early 2000s was responsible for the large magnitude of the financial crisis as it
stimulated a larger shadow banking sector and exposed the economy to more
risks. A natural remedy is to use macroprudential policies to regulate the
banking sector. If macroprudential policies can restrict the size of the bank’s
balance sheet and reduce the associated risk, the crisis could be mitigated.
1.5 Macroprudential Policy
In this section, I study how macroprudential policies can improve welfare by
regulating the production of private safe assets by the bank. I consider a simple
form of macroprudential policy that the government charges an operation tax
that is a constant proportion of the bank’s balance sheet: τXt. The tax
proceeds is then rebated to the household. The law of motion of the bank’s
equity is thus
Wt = σ
B((Xt−1 −R)ZtRX +GRX −Rt−1St−1 − τXt−1).
The macroprudential policy directly affects the profit margin of the bank (RX−
R− τ) and hence affects its balance sheet.
1.5.1 Level vs. Volatility Tradeoff
The macroprudential policy faces a tradeoff between alleviating the safe assets
shortage versus reducing the risk exposure of the banking sector. Since a
shortage of safe assets has a negative effect on the real economy, allowing the
bank to provide more private safe assets alleviates the shortage of safe assets
and improves investment and output. However, when the bank produces more
private safe assets, it also has to conduct more risky projects and thus exposes
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the economy to more aggregate risk. Hence the tradeoff of the macroprudential
policy is between the level of output versus its volatility.
Figure 1·7 shows the steady state value of selected endogenous variables
under different levels of macroprudential policies τ . By using a looser macro-
prudential policy, the regulator raises the profit of the bank and hence enables
the bank to provide more private safe assets. In this way, the regulator alle-
viates the shortage of safe assets. The price of the safe assets is lower and the
return is higher. The private safe assets are more beneficial as a store of value.
As a result, entrepreneurs have more wealth for investment and the steady
state level of output is higher. On the other hand, as a looser macroprudential
policy allows the bank to provide more private safe assets, the bank is also
conducting more risky projects. When τ is reduced from 0.02 to 0, the ratio
of the bank’s risky projects over total projects increases from 0.45 to around
0.6. The economy is exposed to more aggregate risk and thus more volatile.
The variance of output increased by 50%.
1.5.2 Optimal Policy
The level versus volatility tradeoff suggests that there is an optimal level of
macroprudential policy that maximizes welfare. Following Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2001), I measure the welfare cost associated with a particular level of
macroprudential policy by the fraction of steady-state consumption that the
household would be willing to give up in order to be indifferent between the
corresponding constant sequence of consumption and the original stochastic
equilibrium with the macroprudential policy under consideration.
























































































Figure 1·7: Steady State Value under Different Level of Macro-
prudential Policies
given the level of macroprudential policy
E{U(Ct, St); τ} = E{log(Ct) + F log(St); τ}.
I use the theoretical mean calculated by Dynare using a second-order approx-
imation. I then calculate the period utility under the constant consumption
and liquidity service at τ = 0, where the consumption level is a faction ξ below
the steady state level
U((1− ξ)C, S).
The welfare cost associated with the policy level τ is thus the value ξ(τ) such
that the household is indifferent between the above two cases
U((1− ξ(τ))C, S) = E{U(Ct, St); τ}.
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Figure 1·8 shows the consumption equivalent measure of welfare under
different levels of macroprudential policy τ . I plot −ξ so that it measures
directly the welfare rather than the welfare cost. I also plot the welfare measure
relative to the case of no macroprudential policy (−ξ(τ))−(−ξ(0)). The figure
shows that the optimal level of macroprudential policy is reached when τ is
around 0.008, or a tax that is equal to 80 basis points. Relative to the case of no
macroprudential policy (τ = 0), the optimal level of macroprudential policy
improves the welfare by 0.06% equivalent consumption units. The welfare
improvement of macroprudential policy is mild.
















Figure 1·8: Welfare under Different Levels of Macroprudential
Policy
Since the macroprudential policy weighs between the level and the volatil-
ity, the optimal level of macroprudential policy depends on the variance of the
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aggregate shock on the return of risky projects Zt. Figure 1·9 shows how the
optimal level of macroprudential policy τ ∗, which minimizes the welfare cost
ξ(τ), varies with the variance of the aggregate shock. When the variance of the
shock is larger, the need to reduce the volatility of the economy by a tighter
macroprudential policy is stronger, hence the optimal level of macroprudential
policy τ ∗ is larger. Moreover, when the variance of the aggregate shock is low
enough, the optimal level of macroprudential policy is actually negative, which
means the regulator wants to subsidize the production of private safe assets.











Figure 1·9: Optimal Macroprudential Policy Varies with the
Variance of the Aggregate Shock
The optimal level of macroprudential policy also varies with the severity of
the shortage of safe assets. Figure 1·10 shows how the optimal level of macro-
prudential policy varies with the demand for safe assets from the household
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F . Higher demand for safe assets from the household means a more severe
shortage of safe assets. The figure shows that the optimal macroprudential
policy is non-monotone in the severity of the safe asset shortage. This non-
monotone relation is the result of two opposite forces. On the one hand, when
the shortage of safe assets gets more severe, the regulator would loosen the
macroprudential policy to encourage bank to produce more private safe assets
to fill the gap. This force makes the optimal tax rate decrease with the degree
of safe asset shortage, which is reflected on the left part of this figure. On the
other hand, when shortage of safe assets gets very severe, the banking sector
endogenously becomes larger and so does its risk exposure. Hence the optimal
policy should be tighter to restrict the size of the banking sector so the opti-
mal tax rate increases. From this figure we see that when the shortage is not
very severe, the safe asset shortage motivation dominates. When the short-
age is more severe, the risk exposure concern dominates. The combination of
these two forces results in this non-monotone relation between optimal level
of macroprudential policy and the degree of safe asset shortage.
1.5.3 Subsidizing the Entrepreneurs
Since it is the low-type entrepreneurs that really suffer from the shortage of
safe assets, the regulator may use the revenue from taxing the bank to subsi-
dize the entrepreneurs. Figure 1·11 shows the welfare when the tax revenue is
rebated to the entrepreneurs. Unlike the benchmark case when the tax rev-
enue is rebated to the household, the welfare of subsidizing the entrepreneurs
is monotonic increasing in the level of the tax. A tighter macroprudential pol-
icy not only reduces the bank’s risk exposure but also help the entrepreneurs
directly. This result suggests that when the low-type entrepreneurs are con-
strained in finding safe assets and the high-type entrepreneurs are more effi-
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Figure 1·10: Optimal Macroprudential Policy Varies with the
Severity of Safe Asset Shortage
cient in investment than the bank, it is optimal to tax the bank and subsidize
the entrepreneurs.
1.5.4 Public Safe Assets
When the economy is short of safe assets, the government can provide more
public safe assets by issuing government debt. I consider an extension of the
model where both public and private safe assets co-exist as perfect substitutes.
I assume that the government issue debt by taxing on the entrepreneurs. Un-
like the bank where the private safe assets are backed by risky projects, the
government debt is backed by future tax revenues. Thus issuing public safe
assets does not increase the risk exposure of the economy. Moreover, when
34















Figure 1·11: Welfare when Tax Revenue is Rebated to En-
trepreneurs
the interest rate below one, the government can run a primary deficit while
rolling over its debt. However, too much debt will increase the tax burden
on the entrepreneurs and thus reduces investment and output. Issuing public
safe assets is equivalent to a policy that transferring wealth from the high type
entrepreneurs to the low type, since only the low type entrepreneurs will buy
the government bonds.
Figure 1·12 shows the welfare under different level of public safe asset. The
horizontal axis is the debt to output ratio. When the amount of government
debt is low, the cost of issuing government debt low. Issuing more government
debt not only alleviates the safe assets shortage problem, but also crowds out
private safe assets and reduces the risk exposure of the bank. However when
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the level of debt is high, the tax burden on the entrepreneurs becomes large,
which is welfare reducing. Under the current calibration, the optimal level of
debt to gap ratio is around one, which coincidentally matches with the current
level U.S. debt to GDP ratio. But I do not want to claim too much about this
result, because my model is highly stylized and focuses more on qualitative
results rather than quantitive results. The bottom line is that fiscal policy
is important in terms of providing safe assets to the economy, and my model
suggests that government should issue some public safe assets, and leave the
rest to the private banking sector.




























This paper studies the macroprudential policy tradeoff between the benefit
and the risk associated with the production of private safe assets when the
economy is short of safe assets. A shortage of safe assets lowers the return of
safe assets, hinders the function of private safe assets as a store of value, and
leads to a reduction in the entrepreneurs’ wealth and output. The banking
sector expands to produce more private safe assets as the shortage gets more
severe but exposes itself to more aggregate risk. Macroprudential policies can
adjust the production of private safe assets with a tradeoff: encouraging the
production of private safe assets alleviates the shortage of safe assets, at the
cost of more risk exposure of the bank. The optimal level of the macropru-
dential policy depends on the variance of the aggregate shock and the severity
of the safe asset shortage.
Since the model is solved by perturbation around the steady state, the
size of the aggregate shock used in the simulation is too small to reflects big
negative events like the financial crisis. The model is also abstract from many
important amplification mechanisms in the financial sector. Thus the results
of this model are more qualitative rather than quantitative. If one thinks of
larger shocks that are closer to the magnitude of the financial crisis or combines
them with other amplification mechanisms like bank runs, the negative impact
of a safe asset shortage would be more sizable and the optimal macroprudential
policy regarding the shadow banking sector is likely to be tighter.
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Chapter 2
Leverage of Financial Intermediaries
in the Crisis
2.1 Introduction
The 2007-2008 financial crisis makes people realize the importance of the fi-
nancial sector. One important stream of research represented by Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997); Bernanke et al. (1999); Gertler and Karadi (2011); Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010) emphasized the role of borrowers’ balance sheets in con-
straining credit. However, this series of research did not capture the dynamics
of bank leverage observed in the data, which were important since financial
institutions were highly leveraged. The 2007-2008 financial crisis featured a
sharp deleverage of many financial institutions in the shadow banking sector
(Tian, 2019), including investment banks, security brokers and dealers, and
hedge funds. These institutions acted as financial intermediaries that chan-
neled funds from investors to borrowers, but they differed from traditional
banking in that they were financed largely by short-term wholesale borrowing
from the money market. When the initial crisis in the subprime mortgage
market spread to the money market in late 2008, the shadow banks found
themselves have funding difficulties. Creditors were concerned about borrow-
ers’ solvency and reluctant to lend. Shadow banking borrowers were required
for higher margins when borrowing against collaterals, for example in the Repo
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market (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). As the result, financial institutions that
relied heavily on short-term funding were forced to deleverage, reduced their
asset holdings, and ultimately reduced intermediation activity.
In this paper, I first show empirical evidence about the patterns of leverage
of investment banks, security brokers and dealers, and commercial banks. I
find that the leverage of shadow banks, represented by large investment banks
and security brokers and dealers, declined sharply in late 2008 and 2009. By
contrast, the leverage of commercial banks remained stable during the crisis.
The different dynamics of leverage suggest that different types of financial
intermediaries had different leverage determination mechanisms. Investment
banks, security brokers and dealers, and perhaps many other financial interme-
diaries in the shadow banking sector, relied heavily on short-term borrowing
from the money market in a wholesale manner. Their leverage was market-
driven and positively related to market conditions. On the contrary, com-
mercial banks received deposits that are more stable than wholesale funds.
They were often the creditors on the money market and they lent money to
shadow banks. Following this intuition, I find that financial institutions with
more short-term wholesale funding right before the crisis tended to have lower
leverage growth, or deleveraged more, during the crisis.
I then build a general equilibrium model with both shadow banks and com-
mercial banks to distinguish their different leverage patterns. The commercial
banks receive deposits from households. Combined with their equity, they
lend to firms directly or lend to shadow banks in the interbank market. The
shadow banks borrow from the commercial banks and then lend to a different
group of firms. The two-layer banking structure is similar to that in Gertler
et al. (2016). The key difference between the shadow banks and the commer-
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cial banks is how their leverage is determined. The leverage of the shadow
banks is determined by the degree of risk tolerance of their creditors. In a
recession, the shadow banks have higher uncertainty about future returns, so
their creditors are more concerned and lend at a lower leverage. In particular,
I assume that the creditors set the leverage of the shadow banks following
a fixed Value-at-Risk (VaR) rule (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Adrian
and Shin, 2014). For the commercial banks, I assume that their leverage is
determined by the agency friction between the bankers and the depositors as
in Gertler and Karadi (2011): the commercial bankers may divert a fraction
of their total assets for personal use; the depositors limit the leverage of the
commercial banks to keep them from doing so.
My model predicts a sharp decline in the shadow bank leverage after an
uncertainty shock, modeled as an exogenous increase in the volatility of the
productivity of firms. A rise in productivity volatility widens the return dis-
tribution of shadow banks and lowers the leverage allowed by the creditors. A
first-order productivity shock cannot generate such a deleverage since, after a
negative productivity shock, the return of shadow banks becomes higher than
normal due to the lower capital price. Hence the shadow banks have higher
leverage rather than lower. This is consistent with the finding of Nuño and
Thomas (2017). The adverse uncertainty shock also generates the ‘flight-to-
quality’ phenomenon that the commercial banks reallocate assets from inter-
bank lending to loans to safe firms. In summary, the two-layer banking model
with uncertainty shocks successfully generates the observed deleverage of the
shadow banking sector and the ‘flight-to-quality’ of the commercial banking
sector.
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Related Literature The leverage of the financial sector is substantially
studied, especially after the financial crisis. On the empirical side, Adrian and
Shin (2010) find that the leverage growth of investment banks and security
brokers and dealers is positively correlated with assets growth, suggesting pro-
cyclical leverage for these financial institutions. In a following paper Adrian
and Shin (2014), they propose that these financial institutions follow a fixed
Value-at-Risk (VaR) rule. They build a micro-founded model showing that
the fixed VaR rule can be derived from an optimal contracting problem when
banks have limited liability. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) provide the
institutional background that the lenders set margin requirements according to
the VaR rule. Gorton and Metrick (2012) use a novel data set to study the repo
market. They find concerns about the liquidity of the repo collaterals led to
increases in the repo haircuts, implying lower leverage for banks borrowing in
the repo market during the financial crisis. Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) argue
that the contraction in the Repo market has a disproportionately large effect
on a few important dealer banks. He et al. (2010) find that sectors dependent
on Repo financing have reduced asset holdings while the commercial banking
sector increased asset holdings. Ang et al. (2011) find that the leverage of
hedge funds is pro-cyclical. In summary, the previous literature finds that the
leverage of the shadow banking sector is pro-cyclical. My empirical finding
confirms the literature and complements it by pointing out that whether a
bank’s leverage declined during the financial crisis depended on its funding
sources. Banks that relied more on short-term wholesale funding tended to
experience a sharper deleverage.
For theoretical work, Nuño and Thomas (2017) study a model with en-
dogenous leverage constraints under the optimal contract setup proposed by
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Adrian and Shin (2014). The presence of risk-shifting moral hazard gives rise
to a leverage constraint and creates a link between the volatility in bank asset
returns and leverage. They find only volatility shocks can produce empirically
plausible fluctuations in bank leverage. In this paper, I assume that shadow
banks follow a fixed VaR rule, which can be derived by the optimal contract
problem if the return follows generalized extreme value distribution Adrian
and Shin (2014). Tian (2019) develop a model with endogenous bank de-
fault and aggregate uncertainty fluctuation to study the dynamics of shadow
banking. Second-moment shock reproduces the large interbank spread spike,
dramatic deleveraging, and contraction in the shadow banking sector during
the crisis. In his paper, the leverage is optimally chosen by the bank itself
while in my model the bank wants as much leverage as possible and the maxi-
mum leverage is dictated by the market. Nonetheless, both papers emphasize
the importance of uncertainty or volatility shock. Geanakoplos (2010) studies
the leverage cycle from the perspective of heterogeneous beliefs. In his model,
the leverage is endogenously chosen to eliminate default and the main effect
of deleveraging is on asset prices.
This paper borrows from the literature on financial intermediation and its
amplification effect on business cycles. (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Gertler
et al., 2012; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2015) develop a framework to study the
role of financial sector in business cycles. Banks intermediate funds from
households to firms. Bank’s ability to intermediate is constraint by its own
equity due to the agency friction. Negative shock reduces banks’ equity, thus
largely reduces bank’s lending to firms. This channel is called the balance sheet
channel. It works even if banks’ leverage remains constant. One minor defect of
this agency-friction determined leverage is that banks’ leverage increases after
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a negative shock, which does not capture deleverage of the shadow banking
sector observed in the data. The deleveraging of the shadow banks generated
by uncertainty shocks in my model is a distinct channel and is quantitatively
important to study the recent financial crisis. The two-layer of banks setting in
my model is very similar to Gertler et al. (2016) that study runs on wholesale
banks.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 shows the empirical evidence
about the leverage of various financial institutions. Section 2.3 constructs a
two-layer bank model where commercial banks and shadow banks have differ-
ent leverage determination mechanisms. In section 2.4, I calibrate the model
and study its implications. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Evidence of Bank Leverage
In this section, I show empirical evidence about the leverage of investment
banks, security brokers and dealers, and commercial banks. The first two
are important players of the shadow banking sector. Following Adrian and
Shin (2010), I collect balance sheet data of the 8 largest investment banks
in the US: Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch,
Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, Citigroup, and JPMorgan Chase. The first
five are formally investment banks while the last three are usually defined as
commercial banks. However they have absorbed some of the largest indepen-
dent investment banks (Citibank acquired Salomon Brothers in 1998, Chase
acquired JPMorgan in 2000 and Bear Stearns in 2008, and Bank of America
acquired Merrill Lynch in 2008), so they all had investment bank business.
Aggregate data for the security dealers and brokers sector are from the
Financial Accounts of the United States (Z.1). Brokers and dealers are an
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important link in the transmission of funds from savers to investors1. They buy
and sell securities for a fee, hold an inventory of securities for resale, or do both.
They play an important role in financial intermediation. Investment banks
often have broker or dealer businesses. The 8 largest investment banks are all
primary dealers of the Federal Reserve. Therefore the concept of ‘investment
banks’ and ‘security brokers and dealers’ are overlapped. Finally, I collect
balance sheet data for all U.S. commercial banks from their call reports from
the Federal Reserve. I constructed a balanced sample for commercial banks
from 1990:I to 2010:I.
2.2.1 Leverage of Investment Banks
Figure 2·1 shows the asset-weighted mean leverage of the eight largest invest-
ment banks in the United States. The leverage started to rise in 2005 and
reached its local climax right before the financial crisis. During the crisis, the
leverage plunged sharply by almost a half. It then remained low after the
crisis. The sharp deleveraging of the investment banks was only relevant for
the 2007-2008 crisis. There was no such deleveraging in the early 1990s and
early 2000s recessions. This suggests that the 2007-2008 financial crisis was
different from the previous recessions that the financial sector played a more
important role.
Figure 2·2 is the scatter plot between the leverage growth rate of the in-
vestment banks and the GDP growth rate for the sample covering the financial
crisis (from 2004:I to 2018:I). The figure shows a positive relationship between
the leverage growth and the GDP growth. The linear regression of the lever-
age growth on the GDP growth yields a coefficient of 2.46 and an R-square of
31.9%. The result suggests that investment banks have pro-cyclical leverages
1See Z.1: Financial Accounts of the United States - All Table Descriptions.
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and confirms with Adrian and Shin (2010) and Nuño and Thomas (2017).
This positive relationship between the leverage growth and the GDP growth
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Figure 2·1: Leverage of Investment Banks
2.2.2 Leverage of Security Brokers And Dealers
Figure 2·3 shows the leverage of the security broker and dealer sector from 1990
to 2018. Like the investment banks, security brokers and dealers also increased
their leverage around 2004 till the financial crisis and then deleveraged sharply
during the crisis. Again there were no such deleverage patterns in the previous
recessions.
Figure 2·4 is the scatter plot between the leverage growth of the security
broker and dealer sector and the GDP growth for the sample covering the
financial crisis (from 2004:I to 2018:I). The figure shows a similar positive re-
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Figure 2·2: Leverage and GDP Growth, Investment Banks
banks. The linear regression of the leverage growth on the GDP growth yields
a coefficient of 5.08 and an R-square of 50.8%.
2.2.3 Leverage of Commercial Banks
The leverage of commercial banks has a different pattern than investment
banks and brokers and dealers. Commercial banks are very different in their
size, ranging from a few million to 1.7 trillion with a median of 75 million.
The sample distribution is highly skewed with skewness of 57. Thus, in Figure
2·5, I plot the mean leverage across different asset quantile groups. Banks in
the lower asset quantile groups did have show a deleveraging pattern during
the financial crisis. For most commercial banks, their leverage remained sta-
ble during the financial crisis. Only the largest 1% banks, or the 50 largest
U.S. banks, experienced a moderate leverage decline in the later period of the
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Figure 2·3: Leverage of Security Broker and Dealer
or broker and dealer functions, therefore share a similar deleveraging pattern
with investment banks and the aggregate broker and dealer sector. Larger
banks also had higher leverage before the crisis. The result is robust to other
quantile cutoffs. Figure 2·6 plots the leverage growth during the financial cri-
sis (from 2007:IV to 2010:IV) across all 100 quantiles of average assets. Only
those banks in the largest quantiles experienced a leverage decline during the
financial crisis.
To state this result more formally, I follow Adrian and Shin (2010) to regress
the banks leverage growth on the asset growth to measure the cyclicality of
leverage2. As shown in Table 2.1, the leverage of the investment banks, and
the broker and dealer sector present a strong pro-cyclical pattern: the leverage
grows with the total asset. The coefficients are positive and the R-square
are large. In contrast, the leverage of most commercial banks are a-cyclical.





















































-4 -2 0 2 4
GDP Growth%
n = 55    RMSE =  8.766627
lev = -11.883 + 5.0788 gdp    R2 = 50.8%
Figure 2·4: Leverage and GDP growth, Security Broker and
Dealer
Both the coefficient and the R-square are fairly small. Only the largest 1%
commercial banks have pro-cyclical leverage. The coefficient and the R-square
are similar to those of investment banks and the broker and dealer sector.
Therefore, I conclude that the shadow banking sector deleveraged sharply in
the crisis while most commercial banks maintained a stable leverage. Also
the sample of all commercial banks have some overlapping with the shadow
banking sector at the top of the size distribution. Therefore I use this sample to
explore what factor caused this contrasting leverage pattern between shadow
banks and commercial banks.
2.2.4 Deleverage and Funding Source
The different leverage patterns for the shadow banking sector and the com-
mercial banking sector are related to their funding sources. He et al. (2010)
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Figure 2·5: Leverage of Commercial Banks by Asset Quantile
nanced. Sectors dependent on short-term wholesale financing, which describes
the shadow banking industry, reduced their leverage during the most recent
crisis. Figure 2·7 shows that security brokers and dealers indeed rely heavily
on short-term wholesale funding. Security repurchase agreement accounts for
more than 60% of total liabilities before the crisis. When borrowing heavily
on the wholesale money market, their leverage is set by the creditors and is
sensitive to the market conditions, especially in a panic financial crisis. On the
other hand, commercial banks receive household deposits, which is more stable
funding source since it enjoys the deposit insurance. Figure 2·8 shows the ma-
jor liabilities of U.S. chartered depository institutions, which is a synonym for
commercial banks. Time and saving deposits account for about 60% of total
liabilities of commercial banks. Besides, commercial banks have also access to
Federal Reserve discount window loans throughout the crisis He et al. (2010).
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Figure 2·6: Leverage Growth of Commercial Banks in the Cri-
sis by Asset Quantile
ing them to acquire investment banks that were in trouble. As a result, they
did not experience the deleverage as shadow banks.
To further study the relationship between leverage and funding sources, I
run the following regression to explore whether the bank’s reliance on short-
term wholesale funding affects the bank’s leverage dynamics during the crisis:
LeverageGrowthi = α + βShortTermFundingi + γControls+ εi
The dependent variable is the leverage growth rate of a bank in the crisis
period (from 2007:IV to 2010:IV). I use a bank’s share of Repo borrowing over
total assets as a measure of a bank’s reliance on short-term funding. I first
calculate a bank’s net Repo borrowing position by subtracting Repo lending
(quarterly average of Fed funds sold and securities purchased under Repo) from
Repo borrowing (quarterly average of Fed funds purchased and securities sold
50
Quantile Coefficient R-square
Investment Banks 0.60 48.1%
Security Brokers and Dealers 0.89 78.6%
Commercial Banks
< 50% -0.08 0.7%
50% - 90% 0.10 0.7%
90% - 99% -0.04 0.4%
> 99% 0.47 24.0%
Table 2.1: Regression Results: Leverage Growth on Asset
Growth
under Repo). I then calculate the net Repo borrowing share over total assets.
Then for each bank I calculate its average net Repo borrowing share across
the pre-crisis period (from 2005:I to 2007:IV). I also run the same regression
using positive and negative Repo positions separately as a robustness check.
Since larger banks and banks with higher pre-crisis leverage were more likely
to deleverage during the financial crisis (Figure 2·5), I control for log asset and
average leverage before the financial crisis. The regression result is shown in
Table 2.2.
Banks with more net Repo financing before the crisis experienced more
deleveraging (less leverage growth) during the crisis. One percent increase in
the share of net Repo borrowing before the financial crisis reduces the leverage
growth rate in the crisis by -0.53 percentage point (column 2). The regressions
also show that banks with higher pre-crisis leverage experience larger leverage
declines during the crisis. Without the net Repo share, larger banks tend
to deleverage more during the crisis, which is consistent with the results in
Figure 2·5 and Figure 2·6. However, once the net Repo share is included in
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Figure 2·7: Major Fundings of Security Brokers and Dealers
One concern about the above regression is that banks with more short-
term wholesale borrowing may mechanically have less deposit funding, which
is argued to be more stable during the financial crisis. Hence I also include the
bank’s deposit share of total liability as a control variable (column 3). The
result suggests that having more deposits as a funding source does not help
mitigate the deleveraging during the crisis.
One alternative interpretation of the regression results is that banks delever-
aged during the financial crisis because they had lower quality. Banks with
inferior ability to invest suffered bigger losses and therefore deleveraged more
during the crisis. These banks might not be able to attract deposits as a stable
funding source and thus relied more on wholesale short-term funding. The re-
gression may have omitted variable bias. In column 4, I control for the bank’s
pre-crisis return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for the bank’s ability and quality.
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Figure 2·8: Major Fundings of U.S. Chartered Depository In-
stitutions
share. The variable ROA itself is not significant. The coefficient for ROA is
negative suggesting that banks with higher pre-crisis ROA tend to experience
more deleveraging during the crisis. This result is more consistent with the
story that some banks took advantage of the pre-crisis boom by borrowing
more in the wholesale market and achieved higher profits, but then suffered
bigger losses during the crisis and were forced to deleverage.
In summary, the empirical evidence shows that the shadow banking sector,
i.e., investment banks and brokers and dealers experienced sharp deleverag-
ing during the crisis while most commercial banks did not. These contrasting
leverage dynamics are related to the difference in the funding sources: banks
that relied more on short-term wholesale funding experienced more delever-
aging during the crisis. These findings, putting together, suggest financial
institutions should be modeled separately depending on their funding sources
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and leverage dynamics. In particular, commercial banks and large investment
banks should have different leverage determination mechanisms. As suggested
by He et al. (2010), “... the right model to understand the adjustments in
2008 is the one that emphasizes leverage constraints on shadow banking sec-
tor (hedge funds, broker/dealer, etc.) and at the same time emphasizes equity
risk-capital constraints on the traditional commercial banking sector.” In the
next section, I build a two-layer banking model following this idea.
Leverage growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverage -2.082*** -1.924*** -1.928*** -1.974***
(0.283) (0.284) (0.281) (0.286)
Log asset -1.062*** -0.199 -0.133 -0.123
(0.401) (0.458) (0.466) (0.446)






Constant 40.72*** 27.79*** 23.28* 28.32***
(5.395) (6.296) (13.23) (6.594)
Observations 5,034 5,034 5,034 5,034
R-squared 0.025 0.033 0.033 0.033
This table shows the results of regressing leverage growth on bank’s reliance on
short-term funding. The dependent variable is the leverage growth rate of a bank
in the crisis period (from 2007:IV to 2010:IV). Net Repo share is a bank’s Repo
borrowing minus Repo lending, divided by total assets. All independent variables
are average across the pre-crisis period (from 2005:I to 2007:IV). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.2: Leverage Growth on Bank’s Reliance on Short-Term
Funding
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2.3 A Two-Layer Banking Model
In this section, I build a model where banks have different funding sources and
leverage determinations, and study how this setup affects the aggregate econ-
omy. The model is based on Gertler and Karadi (2011); Gertler et al. (2016),
with the modification that I adopt different leverage determinations for dif-
ferent types of banks. The economy consists of households, goods-producing
firms, capital firms, and most importantly, two types of financial intermedi-
aries: a shadow banking sector and a commercial banking sector. The shadow
banking sector represents financial institutions like investment banks and bro-
kers and dealers that finance themselves mainly using short-term wholesale
borrowing. The commercial banking sector represents traditional banks that
finance themselves mainly by deposits. Each banking sector consists of a
continuum of identical banks, hence I will use ‘shadow banks’ (‘commercial
banks’) and ‘the shadow banking sector’ (the commercial banking sector) in-
terchangeably.
Households save deposits in commercial banks. Commercial banks can
either lend to shadow banks in the interbank market or invest in the firms.
Shadow banks borrow from commercial banks and then invest in firms. I
assume the possibility that the firms invested by commercial banks and shadow
banks are different. In particular, shadow banks invest in riskier firms with
higher productivity volatility. Both types of firms purchase capital from capital
firms, hire labor from the households and produce final goods. Finally, the
households earn wage income and get all the profit from banks and firms. They
optimize between consumption and saving.
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2.3.1 Good-producing Firms
Competitive good-producing firms combine capital and labor to produce final
consumption goods using a decreasing returns technology. I allow the pos-
sibility that the firms invested by commercial banks and shadow banks are
different. In particular, firms invested by shadow banks are riskier in terms
of productivity volatility. I use the subscription r (risky) to represent firms
invested by shadow banks, and subscription s (safe) to represent firms invested













where α+ν < 1 and τ ∈ (0, 1]. At is the productivity (TFP) shock. Yrt, Yst are
output, Krt, Kst are capital and Lrt, Lst are labor of risky and safe firm respec-
tively. Risky and safe firms differ only in their exposure to the productivity
shock. Safe firms are safer because they have smaller exposure to productivity
shock as τ ≤ 1.
Firms acquire funds to purchase capital from either commercial banks or
shadow banks, depending on their type, at the end of each period. As in
Gertler and Karadi (2011), I assume that banks can perfectly monitor the
firms and there is no friction between firms and banks. Thus the firms offer
the banks perfectly state-contingent debt (or equity) which is a claim of the
firm’s revenue after labor expenses. In particular, each unit of debt ensures
that the firm can purchase exactly one unit of capital, so the amount of funds
borrowed from the bank per unit of debt is the price of one unit of capital Qt.
Suppose the firm issue St−1 unit of debt
3 at the end of period t− 1 with total
3Firms actually do not choose how much debt to issue. The amount of debt the firm can
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borrowing Qt−1St−1. It enters the next period with Kt = St−1 unit of capital.




















and the undepreciated capital (1− δ)Kt to the bank, where Zt is the per-unit
flow return of debt. The bank can then sell the old capital to the capital-
producing firm at the price Qt. Overall, the return for one unit of a firm’s
debt is
Rkt =
Zt + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
.
Let Swt and Sct be the number of debt securities issued by the risky firms
and safe firms respectively, which are also the amount of loans lent by the
shadow banks and the commercial banks. The capitals for production next
period are thus
Krt+1 = Swt, (2.3)
Kst+1 = Sct. (2.4)
Let Rwkt+1 and R
c
kt+1 represent the loan return for shadow banks and commer-
issue is determined by the bank, which is in turn determined by the bank’s net worth and
leverage.
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cial banks. Following the above derivation, I obtain
Rwkt+1 =





















The shadow banks borrow Bt from the commercial banks at rate Rbt. They
have equity Nwt. They lend QtSwt to risky firms with return R
w
kt+1. Thus the
balance sheet of the shadow banking sector is
QtSwt = Nwt +Bt. (2.9)
Denote Φwt as the leverage of shadow banks:
QtSwt = ΦwtNwt. (2.10)
Shadow banks earn the interest rate spread between Rwkt+1 and Rbt. Over time,
shadow banks’ equity evolves as the difference between earnings on assets and




= (Rwkt+1 −Rbt)QtSwt +RbtNwt
= [(Rwkt+1 −Rbt)Φwt +Rbt]Nwt.
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To capture the sharp deleverage of the shadow banking sector during the
financial crisis, I assume that the leverage of the shadow banking sector is set
by its creditor according to a fixed Value-at-Risk rule (VaR). VaR is a measure
of the loss distribution defined as the smallest threshold loss l such that the
probability that the realized loss turns out to be larger than l is below some
probability p. Let the asset next period is a random variable depending on
the realization of shocks, then:
VaR(p)t ≡ arg inf
l
Pr(Assett+1 < Assett − l) ≤ p.
If a bank were to manage its risk by maintaining p percent Value-at-Risk to
be no larger than its equity capital, i.e., VaR(p)t ≤ Nwt, the bank would
ensure that it remains solvent with probability at least 1−p. Given a negative
productivity shock, higher leverage amplifies the losses and VaR. So a bank
following the fixed-VaR rule needs to deleverage in response to bad shocks.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) documented that hedge funds and broker
and dealers borrow on margins from their lenders. The guiding principle for
margin setting on levered positions is that the lender should be relatively
immune to the borrower’s possible losses. This is exactly the essence of the
fixed-VaR rule. Adrian and Shin (2014) find that large US investment banks
roughly follow the fixed VaR rule.
I assume that the shadow bank’s leverage is set according to the fixed-VaR
rule so that bank’s probability of default is p percent. A shadow bank goes
bankrupt if its equity is less than zero. This will happen if the realized return
on lending Rwkt+1 is too small: R
w
kt+1Φwt −RbtΦwt +Rbt ≤ 0. So the maximum
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where Rst is the p-percent lowest expected realization of shadow bank’s next
period return Rwkt+1, which in turn depends on the realization of At+1 and Qt+1
according to (2.5). This is the threshold return at which the bank is at the
brink of bankruptcy.
I assume that the log aggregate productivity at = log(At) follows an AR1
process:
at+1 = ρaat + σtεat+1, (2.12)
where σt is the time-varying volatility of the log productivity. It also follows
an AR1 processes:
σt+1 − σ = ρs(σt − σ) + εst+1. (2.13)
Here εat is the first-order TFP shock and εst is the uncertainty shock. Both
are standard normal distributed. σ is the steady state value of productivity
volatility. Given today’s at and σt, the p percent worse case of tomorrow’s
log productivity is σtΨ
−1(p) + ρat where Ψ(·) is the CDF of standard normal
distribution. In principle, I need to solve for the p-percent lowest expected re-
sale price of capital Qt+1 and the labor input next period Lrt+1, which requires
numerical solutions. For simplicity, I assume that the financial market believes
that log(Qt+1) is normally distributed in a similar way as productivity with
mean log(Qt) and variance σ
2
t . Also the market ignores any possible changes in
Lrt+1 and sets the cutoff return rate according to the expected value EtLrt+1.
With such a simplifying assumption, the p-percent worst case of the return on
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lending to risky firms is:
Rst =
exp(σtΨ




From Equation (2.14), either a decrease in the productivity level at or a rise
in the productivity volatility σt will lower the threshold return Rs and thus
lower the leverage. It will be clear later that adverse uncertainty shocks are
crucial to generate the deleveraging for shadow banks.
Shadow banks face a limited leverage ratio because the financial market is
concerned about their solvency. The market requires shadow banks to hold
enough equity to cover up potential losses in most cases. I focus on the equilib-
rium where Rwkt+1 > Rbt so that the shadow banks are earning excess returns
and accumulating equity. To prevent banks accumulate too much equity and
become too large, I choose a similar assumption as in Gertler and Karadi (2011)
by assuming in each period shadow bankers pay out a fraction of 1− θw of its
net worth as dividends to the household. The bankers objective is to maximize
the discounted stream of payouts back to the household. They want as much
leverage as possible as long as they are earning excess returns Rwkt+1 > Rbt. As
a result, the leverage constraint (2.11) is binding and the aggregate equity of
the shadow banking sector evolves by4
Nwt = θw[(R
w
kt −Rbt−1)Φwt−1 +Rbt−1]Nwt−1. (2.15)
4Although the leverage is determined by the VaR rule restricting the shadow bank’s
default probability, in this paper, I only consider small shocks near the deterministic steady
state so that banks never actually default.
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2.3.3 Commercial Banks
I model commercial banks in the same way as in Gertler and Karadi (2011)
and Gertler et al. (2012). Commercial banks receive deposits Dt from the
households and promise the depositor a risk-free return Rt. Combining with
their equity Nct, commercial banks lend to safe firms and shadow banks. Let
Bt be the total lending to shadow banks and QtSct be the amount of lending
to safe firms, then the balance sheet of the commercial banking sector is
Bt +QtSct = Nct +Dt. (2.16)
In equilibrium the return of lending to safe firms and lending to shadow banks




Commercial banks earn a positive interest spread between Rckt+1, Rbt and Rt.




= (Rckt+1 −Rt)QtSct + (Rbt −Rt)Bt +RtNct.
Similar to the shadow banks, I assume in each period commercial bankers pay
out 1− θc of net worth as dividends to the household. The banker’s objective
is to maximize the expected discount value of retained earning, given by







+ θcβΛt,t+1Vt+1(Sct+1, Bt+1, Nct+1)},
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where Λt,t+1 = Ct/Ct+1 is the SDF of households. Since lending to safe firms
and lending to the shadow banks have the same expected payoff, what matters
for the bank’s value is the total assets of commercial banks. Denote Sat to be
the total asset:
Sat = Bt +QtSct. (2.18)
I show the value of commercial banks can be written as
Vt = VstSat + VntNct,
Vst = Et{(1− θc)βΛt,t+1(Rckt+1 −Rt) + θcβΛt,t+1yt,t+1Vst+1}, (2.19)









Similar to the shadow banks, commercial banks earn a positive profit on the
positive interest spread and thus want to expand as much deposit as possible.
To restrict the banks’ size, I follow the agency friction assumption used by
Gertler and Karadi (2011). It is assumed that the banker has an option to
divert a fraction λ of the total assets for personal use. In order to incentivize
bankers not to do so, the following incentive constraint must be satisfied:
λSat ≤ Vt.
Denote Φct to be the leverage of commercial banks:
Sat = ΦctNct. (2.21)
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In equilibrium, the incentive constraint must be binding. Combining with






The leverage of commercial banks is determined by the agency friction between
the bankers and the depositors. The agency friction measure λ itself does not
vary with business cycle conditions. Nevertheless, the leverage of commercial
banks varies because the banks’ return and cost vary so do the implicit values of
the bank’s asset and equity (Vst and Vnt). Finally, the equity of the commercial
banking sector evolves according to
Nct = θc[(R
c
kt −Rt−1)Qt−1Sct−1 + (Rbt−1 −Rt−1)Bt−1 +Rt−1Nct−1)]. (2.23)
2.3.4 Capital-producing firms
Capital-producing firms are in charge of capital investments and making new
capitals. At the end of period t, competitive capital-producing firms buy used
capital from the goods-producing firms (or their creditors), and then invest to
build new capital. They then sell the new capital back to the good-producing
firms. The cost of investment is normalized to unity and the new capital is
sold at Qt. Capital-producing firms face a convex investment adjustment cost
f(x) = η(x−1)2 where x is the ratio of investment over its steady-state value.















where I is the steady state investment. This yields the first-order condition
that determines Qt:













The capital stock evolves according to
(Krt+1 +Kst+1) = (1− δ)(Krt +Kst) + It. (2.25)
2.3.5 Households
A representative household consumes Ct and saves by making deposit Dt in the
commercial banks. The household receives labor income wtLt. The household
is the ultimate owner all firms and banks in the economy, and therefore gets
income from the profits of these entities each period. The household maximizes





Ct +Dt = wtLt + Πt +Rt−1Dt−1,
where Πt is all the profits from banks and firms. Optimization yields the Euler
equation:
EtβRtΛt,t+1 = 1 (2.26)
where Λt,t+1 = Ct/Ct+1 is the stochastic discount factor. To focus on the bank-
ing sector, I assume that the household supplies one unit of labor inelastically
so the labor market clearing condition is
Lrt + Lst = Lt = 1 (2.27)
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Finally, there is a resources constraint for the whole economy:
Ct + It = Yrt + Yst. (2.28)
2.3.6 Equilibrium
The equilibrium system consists of 26 equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5),
(2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9), (2.10), (2.11), (2.14), (2.15), (2.16), (2.17), (2.18),
(2.19), (2.20), (2.21), (2.22), (2.23), (2.24), (2.25), (2.26), (2.27), (2.28), plus
two exogenous process (2.12) and (2.13), determining 26 endogenous variables
{Yrt, Yst, Krt, Kst, Lrt, Lst, Ct, Swt, Sct, Sat, Bt, Dt, Nwt, Nct, Rwkt, Rckt, Rbt,
Rst, Rt, wt, Φwt, Φct, Vst, Vnt, Qt, It} and two exogenous variables At and σt.
2.4 Model Result
In this section, I calibrate the model and study how TFP shocks and uncer-
tainty shocks affect the leverage of shadow banks and commercial banks, and
then see how the dynamics of bank leverage affect the real economy.
2.4.1 Calibration
Table 2.3 lists the choice of parameter values. For most of the parameters,
including the discount rate β, the depreciate rate δ, the persistence of TFP
shocks and uncertainty shocks ρa and ρσ, I choose conventional values from the
literature. Following Bloom et al. (2018), I set the capital revenue elasticity
α to be 0.25 and the labor revenue elasticity to be 0.5. The profit retaining
ratios for the shadow banks and the commercial banks are positively related
to the interest rate spreads. I set them to 0.9 and 0.95 respectively that are
close to the choice of Gertler et al. (2016). This implies a dividend payout
ratio of 10% and 5% for the shadow banks and the commercial banks. I set
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the fraction of assets that commercial bankers can divert to be 0.07 so that
the steady-state leverage of the commercial banks is around 12. I choose the
threshold of shadow banks’ VaR rule to be 1 percent so that the steady-state
leverage of the shadow banks is around 24. These numbers match roughly
to their data counterparts. Changing the parameter value does not affect my
result qualitatively.
Parameter Value Explanation
α 0.25 Capital revenue elasticity
ν 0.5 Labor revenue elasticity
θw 0.9 Profit retaining rate for shadow banks
θc 0.95 Profit retaining rate for commercial banks
λ 0.07 Fraction of assets that can be diverted
p 0.01 Default rate tolerance in VaR
τ 0.8 Safe firm exposure of TFP shock
η 1 Investment elasticity
β 0.99 Discount rate
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
ρa 0.9 TFP shock persistence
ρσ 0.9 Volatility shock persistence
σ 0.02 Steady-state TFP shock volatility
Table 2.3: Parameters
2.4.2 Productivity Shocks vs. Uncertainty Shocks
I start by analyzing the impact of a negative technology shock that reduces the
level of TFP by one percentage. Figure 2·9 shows the impulse response of some
key variables. After a negative first-order productivity shock, the leverage of
both shadow banks Φw and commercial banks Φc increases initially by around
20% from the steady state. This contrasts with the empirical evidence where
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shadow banks deleveraged sharply while commercial banks’ leverage remained
stable. This is because, after the negative TFP shock, the price of capital
Q falls sharply due to the shrink of banks’ balance sheets. Despite that the
firms are having lower revenues, the return of bank’s lending increases due to
a much cheaper cost of purchasing new capital (see equation (2.5) and (2.6)).
Hence, both the shadow banks and the commercial banks have higher lending























































































































Figure 2·9: Impulse Response after a Negative TFP Shock
I next analyze the effect of an adverse uncertainty shock. Figure 2·10
shows the impulse response after an increase in the productivity volatility σt
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by half of its steady state value (%50 increase). Unlike the first-order TFP
shock, the uncertainty shock induces a sharp decline of the leverage of the
shadow banking sector. The leverage of the shadow banking sector Φw falls
by more than 40%. An adverse uncertainty shock widens the distribution of
productivity and the firms’ profit, decreases directly the threshold return Rs,
and tightens the VaR constraint for the shadow banking sector. On the other
hand, the leverage of the commercial banking sector increases due to a lower
capital price Q as in the case of a negative TFP shock. The magnitude of such
an increase is smaller, which is more consistent with the empirical evidence
that the leverage of commercial banks remained stable during the financial
crisis.
2.4.3 Flight to Quality
Both the negative first-order TFP shock and the adverse uncertainty shock
generate a ‘flight-to-quality’ phenomenon where the commercial reduces its
interbank lending and increases its lending to safe firms (Figure 2·9 and 2·10,
the second row, the middle and right column). Two things generate this
result. Firstly, the shadow banking sector has a higher leverage than the
commercial banking sector in the steady state. Secondly, the risky firms that
the shadow banking sector invests have larger exposure to the negative TFP
shock. Both factors cause the shadow banking sector to suffer a heavier loss
than the commercial banking sector. Thus, the commercial banking sector
retracts funds from the more contracted interbank market and allocates instead
more funds to the safe firms. As a result, the output from risky firms drops
while the output from safe firms increases. Also, the interest spread of the risky
firms increases more than that of the safe firms. The total output falls only






















































































































Figure 2·10: Impulse Response after an Adverse Uncertainty
Shock
reallocation is much larger, at the magnitude of 10. On the aggregate level,
the financial accelerator emphasized by Bernanke et al. (1999) is mitigated.
However, if the commercial banks, instead of lending to the safe firms who
still produce, choose other safer investment options like saving in the treasury
securities, there will not be an increase in the output from the safe firms that
partially cancels the output decline from the risky firms. In this case, the
decline in the total output will be more amplified. The ‘flight-to-quality’ is
consistent with what we observed in the data. Figure 2·11 shows the asset
composition of commercial banks at the aggregate level. After the burst out
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of the financial crisis, commercial banks reduced the holdings of Fed funds
Repos but increased the holdings of safer securities including treasury security,



















2000q1 2004q3 2009q1 2013q3 2018q1
Fed funds Repo Reserve
Treasury security GSE backed security
Figure 2·11: Asset Composition of Commercial Banks
In summary, the above two experiments point out the importance of uncer-
tainty shocks and the VaR constraint in generating the observed deleveraging
of the shadow banks. Bloom et al. (2018) argued that both a negative first-
moment shock and a positive second-moment shock of productivity are needed
to match business cycles. In the two-layer banking model where shadow banks
and commercial banks are modeled separately, a single adverse uncertainty
shock can reproduce both the deleveraging of the shadow banking sector and
the flight-to-quality of the commercial banking sector, while the first-moment
TFP shock leads to leverage dynamics that are inconsistent with the data.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine empirical evidence of leverage for various types of fi-
nancial intermediaries. I find the shadow banking sector, including investment
banks, security brokers and dealers, deleveraged sharply during the financial
crisis while the commercial banks maintained their leverage. The contrasting
leverage patterns between the shadow banks and the commercial banks can be
explained by their different funding sources. Financial institutions that relied
more on short-term wholesale funding tended to deleverage more during the
crisis. I then build a model to incorporate both shadow banks and commercial
banks with different leverage determination mechanisms. The leverage of the
shadow banks is determined by the Value-at-risk rule while the leverage of the
commercial banks is determined by the agency friction between the bankers
and the depositors. An adverse uncertainty shock reproduces both the delever-
aging of the shadow banking sector and the flight-to-quality of the commercial
banking sector, while the first-moment TFP shock leads to leverage dynamics
that are inconsistent with the data.
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Chapter 3
Monetary Policy and Rational Asset
Price Bubbles: Comment
3.1 Introduction
Due to the recent financial crisis during 2008-2009, there is a renewed interest
in understanding the role of asset bubbles in business cycles and the associated
policy implications. Gaĺı (2014) presents an elegant overlapping generations
model with nominal rigidities to study the impact of monetary policy on ratio-
nal asset bubbles. He finds some intriguing results that are inconsistent with
conventional views. These results are summarized below:
• A stronger interest rate response to bubble fluctuations (i.e., a “leaning
against the wind policy”) may raise the volatility of asset prices and of
their bubble component.
• The optimal monetary policy strikes a balance between stabilization of
current aggregate demand and the bubble. If the average size of the
bubble is sufficiently large, the latter motive will be dominant, making
it optimal for the central bank to lower interest rates in the face of a
growing bubble.
In this paper we revisit Gaĺı’s analysis by extending his model to allow for
serially correlated bubble shocks. Our analysis complements his. We argue
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that his results are driven by his particular choice of the equilibrium solution.
In his model there are multiple steady states and multiple equilibria. In par-
ticular, there is a continuum of stable bubbly steady states and a continuum
of unstable bubbly steady states. He focuses on a backward-looking sunspot
solution around a stable bubbly steady state. For this solution the value of
a pre-existing asset bubble only responds to its own innovations. In the ab-
sence of such innovations, the size of an old bubble is predetermined, and an
increase in the interest rate will raise its future size. By contrast we analyze
the forward-looking minimal state variable (MSV) solution around an unstable
bubbly steady state. For this solution the asset bubble responds to shocks on
impact just like any asset prices. An increase in interest rates dampens the
asset bubble on impact. We find results that are consistent with conventional
views and are different from Gaĺı’s results mentioned above. In particular,
the optimal policy calls for a leaning-against-the-wind rule. Note that this
result depends on the assumption of serially correlated bubble shocks. If bub-
ble shocks are serially uncorrelated, monetary policy would not affect bubble
volatility for the MSV solution.
All steady states and equilibria in Gaĺı’s model are consistent with rational
expectations. Following the methodology surveyed by Evans and Honkapohja
(1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2012), we use learning as a selection device
to select a particular steady state and a particular equilibrium.1 The idea is
that agents of the model do not initially have rational expectations and they
instead form forecasts by using some adaptive learning rules such as recursive
least squares based on the data. The question is whether the agents can learn a
particular equilibrium or a particular steady state. Marcet and Sargent (1989),
1See Bullard and Mitra (2002); Adam (2003); Woodford (2011); Duffy and Xiao (2007);
Benhabib et al. (2014); Christiano et al. (2018), among others, for the application of learning
to select equilibrium in macroeconomic models.
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Evans and Honkapohja (1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2012) show that
the notion of expectational stability (E-stability) determines local convergence
of real time recursive learning algorithms in a wide variety of economic models.
We find that the sunspot equilibrium solution adopted by Gaĺı (2014) is not
E-stable under his optimal monetary policy rule, but the forward-looking MSV
solution is E-stable. We also find that the unstable bubbly steady state Pareto
dominates the stable bubbly steady state. Moreover the former steady state
is E-stable, but the latter is not. Our results are analogous to those in Evans
et al. (2007) and Evans et al. (2001). They show that the E-unstable high-
inflation steady state in a hyperinflation model has counterintuitive policy
implications, while the E-stable low inflation steady state has conventional
implications.
3.2 Solving Gaĺı’s Model
We first summarize Gaĺı’s (2014) model and refer the reader to his paper
for detailed economic interpretations. We extend his model by allowing for
persistent bubble shocks. We then solve for all equilibria and select equilibrium
using a learning device.
3.2.1 Setup
The model economy consists of overlapping generations of agents, firms, and
a central bank. Each agent lives for two periods and an agent born in pe-
















dles and ε > 1. Each young agent is endowed with one unit of labor and
supplies it to firms inelastically. Normalize the size of each cohort to unity.
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Each young agent is endowed with δ ∈ (0, 1) units of an intrinsically useless
bubble asset. The bubble asset can be traded in an asset market. Each period
a fraction δ of each vintage of bubble assets loses its value so that the total
amount of bubble assets outstanding remains constant and equal to one. This
modeling allows a new bubble to be created once an old bubble bursts, as in
Martin and Ventura (2012), Wang and Wen (2012), and Miao et al. (2015).
An agent born in period t chooses differentiated consumption goods C1,t (i)
and C2,t+1 (i), bond holdings Z
M
t , and holdings Z
B
t|t−k of bubble asset intro-





















di = Dt+1 +















is the consumption price index, Wt is the real
wage, it is the nominal interest rate, Dt+1 is firm dividends, and Q
B
t|t−k is the
period-t real price of the bubble asset introduced in period t − k. Define the
gross real interest rate as




Each agent owns a firm that produces a differentiated product Yt (i) us-
ing labor input Nt (i) according to the technology Yt (i) = Nt (i). Each firm
is monopolistically competitive and sets price P ∗t one period in a advance,
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subject to the demand schedule Yt (i) = (P
∗
t /Pt)
−εCt, where Ct = C1,t + C2,t.








where M = ε/ (ε− 1) denotes the markup.
The labor and goods markets clearing implies
C1,t + C2,t = 1, (3.4)
Dt +Wt = 1. (3.5)
Asset market clearing requires ZMt = 0 and Z
B
t|t−k = δ (1− δ)
k . Define the








Let Ut = δQ
B
t|t denote the size of new bubbles. Then by definition and the
agent’s bubble asset choice condition,
Qt = Bt + Ut, (3.6)







The consumption Euler equation gives









The budget constraint (3.1) and the market-clearing conditions imply
C1,t +Qt = Wt + Ut. (3.9)
To close the model, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate accord-
ing to a feedback rule, which may respond to asset bubbles,











where φπ > 0, Πt = Pt/Pt−1 denotes gross inflation, and a variable without
time subscript denotes its steady-state value. The central questions are how
monetary policy affects asset bubbles and whether monetary policy should
respond to asset bubbles.
The equilibrium system consists of eight equations (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.6),
(3.7), (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10) for nine stochastic processes {C1,t} , {C2,t} , {Dt} ,
{Wt} , {Πt} , {it} , {Qt} , {Bt} , and {Ut} . Since there are eight equilibrium con-
ditions for nine variables, the equilibrium system cannot determine the size of
the old bubble and the new bubble independently. Gaĺı (2014) assumes that
the new bubble {Ut} is an exogenously given IID process. We consider the
more general case in which {Ut} is serially correlated. Gaĺı (2014) also con-
siders the innovation in the old bubble Bt − Et−1Bt as another independent
source of uncertainty. We will show below that this is true for the sunspot




We first present Gaĺı’s results in the deterministic case where Ut = U > 0 for
all t. Then the old bubble {Bt} satisfies the difference equation
Bt+1 =
(1− 1/M) (Bt + U)
β/M− (1 + β)Bt − U
≡ H (Bt, U) . (3.11)
The necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a deterministic
bubbly steady state is given by
M < 1 + β. (3.12)
Furthermore, when this condition is satisfied there exists a continuum of stable
bubbly steady states indexed by U ,
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and a continuum of unstable bubbly steady states also indexed by U,
{




Ū = β + (1 + β) (1−W )− 2
√
β (1 + β) (1−W ) > 0 and W = 1
M
.
The economy also has a bubbleless steady state in which B = U = 0. In this
steady state we can show the bubbleless real interest rate is Rf = (M− 1) /β.
Thus condition (3.12) is the same as Rf < 1, which is the standard condition
in the literature (Tirole, 1985), i.e., the bubbleless equilibrium is dynamically
inefficient.
Next we study the stochastic case by log-linearizing the equilibrium system
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(εB − φb)(R− 1)
(φb + 1)R
Et−1ut,
where we use a lower case variable to denote the log deviation from its steady-









∈ (0, 1) .





risk of confusion, we use the same notation B to represent either one of the
steady-state size of the old bubble in the analysis below.
Our objective is to solve for a rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
using (3.13). Gaĺı (2014) assumes that ut is IID. We consider a more general
AR(1) process
ut = ρut−1 + et, ρ ∈ [0, 1), (3.14)
where et is an IID random variable with mean zero and variance σ
2
e .
Gaĺı (2014) focuses his analysis on a sunspot solution around a stable
bubbly steady state. Given (3.14), we can derive the following more general
solution. Its proof and the proofs of the remaining propositions in the paper
are given in Appendix B.2.




. For any b0, there is a linear sunspot solu-
tion in a neighborhood of the bubbly stable steady state given by
bt = χbt−1 + (1−R) (1 + εB) ρut−2 + ϕ∗2et + ϕ∗3et−1 + ϕ∗4ξt + ϕ∗5ξt−1,
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ϕ∗3 + (R− 1) (1 + φb)
R (φb + 1)− χ
, ϕ∗4 =
ϕ∗5
R(φb + 1)− χ
,
χ = R (1 + εB (1 + β)) ∈ (0, 1).
Gaĺı (2014) shows that χ = ∂H (B,U) /∂B. For a stable bubbly steady
state, we must have χ ∈ (0, 1) , which also implies that the backward-looking
solution in Proposition 3.1 is stationary. Gaĺı (2014) defines a sunspot variable
ξt = bt − Et−1bt. Substituting this variable into (3.13) yields a particular
solution
bt = χbt−1 + (φb + 1) (1−R)ut−1 − (φb − εB)(1−R)ρut−2 (3.15)
+ξt + (φb − εB (1 + β))Rξt−1,
which can also be obtained by setting
ϕ∗2 = 0, ϕ
∗
3 = (1−R) (1 + φb) , ϕ∗5 = (φb − εB (1 + β))R
in our general solution given in Proposition 3.1. The solution in equation (30)
of Gaĺı (2014) corresponds to ρ = 0 in (3.15).
For this solution, the initial value b0 is indeterminate. Gaĺı (2014) derives
all his results for a fixed b0. From (3.15) we can see that monetary policy
only affects the anticipated component of the old bubble Et−1bt through the
interest rate coefficient φb. In the case of ρ = 0, Gaĺı (2014) shows that a
leaning-against-the-wind policy which corresponds to φb > 0 generates a larger
volatility in the bubble than a policy of benign neglect (φb = 0).
Now we consider the solution in the neighborhood of the unstable bubbly
steady state.
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. There is a unique forward-looking linear
solution in a neighborhood of the unstable bubbly steady state given by














where χ = R (1 + εB (1 + β)) > 1.
In a neighborhood of the unstable bubbly steady state, we have χ > 1.
The backward-looking solution in (3.15) is not stationary. We must solve for bt
forward to obtain the forward-looking solution in (3.16) so that bt is stationary.
This solution is also called the minimal state variable (MSV) solution in the
literature (e.g., Evans and Honkapohja (2012)). In the next section we will
focus our analysis on this solution.
Note that if ρ = 0 as in Gaĺı (2014), then the MSV solution gives bt =
et (R− 1) /R. In this case monetary policy through φb does not affect bubble
dynamics. We thus assume ρ ∈ (0, 1) throughout the paper.
3.2.3 Learning and Equilibrium Selection
There are multiple (deterministic) steady states and multiple REE solutions
in Gaĺı (2014). We will use learning as a selection device to select a particular
steady state and a particular REE solution. To understand the basic idea, we
consider an economic model with a solution described as a particular parameter
vector ϕ̄ (e.g., the parameters of an autoregressive process or a steady state).
Under adaptive learning agents do not know ϕ̄ but estimate it from data using
a statistical procedure such as least squares. This leads to estimates ϕt at
time t and the question is whether ϕt → ϕ̄ as t→∞. Evans and Honkapohja
(2012) show that, for a wide range of economic examples and learning rules,
convergence is governed by the corresponding E-stability condition, i.e., the
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local asymptotic stability of ϕ̄ under the differential equation
dϕ
dτ
= T (ϕ)− ϕ, (3.17)
where τ denotes notional or virtual time, T (ϕ) is the mapping from the per-
ceived law of motion (PLM) ϕ to the implied actual law of motion (ALM)
T (ϕ). In the following analysis we will check the E-stability condition.
We start by the steady states.




, the bubbly unstable steady state
Pareto dominates the bubbly stable steady state. Moreover the bubbly unstable
steady state is E-stable if and only if φb > −1 and the bubbly stable steady
state is E-stable if and only if φb < −1.2
Next we consider the stochastic MSV and sunspot solutions.
Proposition 3.4. For φb > −1 the sunspot solution in Proposition 1 is not E-
stable. The MSV solution in Proposition 3.2 is E-stable if and only if φb > −1.
Gaĺı (2014) shows that the optimal response coefficient φb that minimizes
the welfare loss is greater than −1 for the sunspot solution. Proposition 3.4
shows that this solution under the optimal policy is not E-stable. By contrast,
the MSV solution for φb > −1 is E-stable. In the next section we will show
that the optimal coefficient φb is positive for the MSV solution and hence the
MSV solution under optimal monetary policy is E-stable.
2In a previous version of the paper, we started with the deterministic system (3.11)
directly. The PLM is Bt+1 = a and ALM is T (a) = H
−1 (a, U) . The ODE is ȧ = T (a)− a.
In this case the assumption on φb is not needed.
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3.3 Monetary Policy
What is the impact of the monetary policy on bubble dynamics? We first use
(3.16) to compute the volatility of the old bubble
























− 1 < 0. (3.18)
Gaĺı (2014) shows that the volatility of both the old and aggregate bubbles is
minimized at φb = −1 for his sunspot solution.
Now we log-linearize equation (3.6) to obtain
qt = Rbt + (1−R)ut (3.19)
and combine it with (3.16) to derive the volatility of the aggregate bubble for
our MSV solution:















Thus a leaning-against-the-wind policy (i.e., φb > 0) generates a lower volatil-
ity of the aggregate bubble than a policy of benign neglect (φb = 0), contrary
to Gaĺı’s result. The volatility is minimized when φb → +∞. Interestingly,
when φb decreases to negative infinity, the bubble volatility also decreases to
zero. However, since in this case the MSV solution is E-unstable, the adaptive
learning perspective argues against the relevance of this case: restriction at-
tention to values of φb for which the solution is learnable, increasing φb reduces
bubble volatility.
The results above show that the volatilities of the old and aggregate bub-
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bles are proportional to the volatility of new bubble innovations, which are the
only source of uncertainty. By contrast, for the sunspot solution in Gaĺı (2014)
(see (3.15) here), innovations in old bubbles are another source of uncertainty
that can drive the movements of the aggregate bubble independent of funda-
mentals. This is an appealing feature, though both sources of uncertainty are
not observable and hardly testable.
Figure 3·1 presents the relation between φb and the volatilities of the old
and aggregate bubbles for the MSV solution. We choose the same parameter
values as in Gaĺı (2014) by setting β = 1, ε = 6, U = 0.175. These val-
ues imply Bs = 0.1, Bu = 0.1458, and M = 1.2. While Gaĺı (2014) studies
equilibria around the stable bubbly steady state Bs = 0.1, we focus on the
solution around the unstable bubbly steady state Bu = 0.1458. Gaĺı’s result
is illustrated in Figure 2 of his paper, which shows that the bubble volatility
increases with φb > 0.








































Note: This figure plots the standard deviations of the aggregate bubble qt and old
bubble bt for various coefficients φb. The vertical line indicates the value of φb that
minimizes the standard deviation of the old bubble. The parameter values are β = 1,
ε = 6, U = 0.175, φπ = 2, ρ = 0.8, and σ
2
e = 0.01. We focus on the unstable bubbly
steady state with B = 0.1458.
Figure 3·1: Monetary Policy and Bubble Volatility
To understand the intuition behind Figure 3·1, we consider the economy’s
responses to an exogenous positive bubble shock to ut. We first use equations
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(3.2), (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8) to derive the log-linearized asset pricing equation
qt = Etbt+1 − rt, (3.20)
which says that total bubble is equal to the future old bubble discounted by rt.












Solving forward shows that the old bubble is equal to the (negative) discounted
value of future real interest rates and new bubbles. Since 0 < R < 1, new
bubbles {ut} act as negative dividends. An increase in ut has a direct effect
of lowering bt and an indirect effect through the change in the interest rate rt.
Due to the endogenous response of rt, a unique forward-looking solution for bt
exists as shown in Proposition 3.2, even when 0 < R < 1. In contrast to Gaĺı
(2014), bt is a jump variable and responds to shocks on impact like any asset
prices.
The impact of monetary policy on asset bubbles qt and bt is transmitted
through the real interest rate rt, which in turn depends on the size of bubbles
bt. Thus we need to understand the dynamic responses of rt for different values
of φb. In Appendix B.3 we show that







φbρ(R− 1)(εB + 1)
(φb + 1)(χ− ρ)
et. (3.22)
When ρ = 0, rt = 0 and bt = et (R− 1) /R by Proposition 3.2. It follows from
(3.20) that qt = 0. The intuition is that the impact of a positive new bubble
shock on the aggregate bubble is exactly offset by a negative response of the
old bubble so that the size of the aggregate bubble does not change. Thus the
value of φb does not affect the real interest rate by the monetary policy rule
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in (3.10) and hence it does not affect bubble dynamics.
Figure 3·2 presents the impulse response functions for {bt} , {qt} , {rt} , and
{πt} given a 1% shock to e0 in period 0 for ρ = 0.8. When monetary policy
does not respond to bubbles (φb = 0), a positive shock to expand the new
bubble u0 at date 0 crowds out the size of old bubbles b0 and dampens the
aggregate bubble q0, but r0 does not change, as shown in equations (3.16),
(3.19), and (3.22).




























































Note: This figure plots the impulse response functions for a one percent positive
new bubble shock, in percentage deviation from the steady state. The parameter
values are β = 1, ε = 6, U = 0.175, φπ = 2, ρ = 0.8, and σ
2
e = 0.01. We focus on
the unstable bubbly steady state with B = 0.1458.
Figure 3·2: Impulse Responses to a New Bubble Shock
When φb > 0, the central bank will cut the interest rate according to the
interest rate rule as q0 and b0 decline and hence the fall of the old and aggregate
bubbles is mitigated by (3.21). For this channel to work we need ρ ∈ (0, 1)
so that the term related to et in (3.22) is negative as R ∈ (0, 1) and χ > 1.
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Both ρ > 0 and the forward-looking solution (initial changes of aggregate
bubbles) are important for a leaning-against-the-wind policy to lower bubble
volatility in response to a bubble shock e0. For a larger φb > 0, the mitigation
effect is stronger so that aggregate and old bubbles respond less to the bubble
shock. This explains why the volatilities of qt and bt decrease with φb > 0 as
illustrated in Figure 3·1.
By contrast, for Gaĺı’s backward-looking solution, we rewrite (3.21) as
bt+1 = Rbt + rt + (1−R)ut + ξt+1,
where ξt = bt − Et−1bt is a sunspot shock and b0 is predetermined. Either
a positive bubble shock or a positive sunspot shock raises the size of future
bubbles without changing the initial size b0. A leaning-against-the-wind policy
with φb > 0 will raise the interest rate rt so that future bubbles will grow
even faster. This explains why such a policy will raise bubble volatility in Gaĺı
(2014).
For our forward-looking solution, Figure 3·2 shows that qt and bt fall on
impact and then gradually rise to their steady state values. Their dynamics
for different values of φb differ only in the initial period. This can be seen from
equations (3.16), (3.19), and (3.22) because R ∈ (0, 1) , et = 0 for t > 0, and
ut is an AR(1) process with persistence ρ > 0. The effect of φb is only on the
terms related to the temporary shock et.
When φb < 0, the old and aggregate bubbles may rise on impact in response
to a positive bubble shock. When the central bank cuts the interest rate to
encourage bubbles, this effect may dominate the direct negative effect of the
rise in the new bubble on the old bubble as shown in equation (3.21). As
shown in Figure 3·2, when φb decreases from −2 to −5, the old and aggregate
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bubbles are dampened and the fall of interest rate is also mitigated. If bubbles
expanded, the central bank would cut the interest rate more, which in turn
would encourage bubbles further. This positive feedback effect might make
the bubble explode.
Since firms adjust prices one period in advance before shocks are realized,
the inflation rate πt is predetermined. Thus it does not respond to the bubble
shock on impact. As shown in Figure 3·2, it may rise or fall in the second period
depending on the value of φb. In Appendix B.3 we show that the inflation rate
around the unstable bubbly steady state is given by
πt =
ρ(R− 1)[ρ(εB + 1) + (1 + φb)(βεBR− ρ)]
φπ(χ− ρ)
ut−1.
If φb = 0, the inflation rate falls in the second period because R ∈ (0, 1) and
χ > 1. The central bank can stabilize inflation by two strategies: First, it can
set φπ at an arbitrary large value and set φb at a finite value. Second, it can
set φπ at a finite value and set φb = ρ(εB + 1)/ (ρ− βεBR)− 1.
In Gaĺı’s (2014) model inflation is not a source of welfare losses given
synchronized price-setting and an inelastic labor supply. Thus it is not optimal
for the central bank to stabilize inflation. To study optimal monetary policy,
we follow Gaĺı (2014) to take the unconditional mean of an agent’s lifetime
utility as a welfare criterion. In a neighborhood of a steady state, we can
derive the second-order approximation to the mean:
E [lnC1,t + β lnC2,t+1] ' lnC1 + β lnC2 −
1
2
(V ar (c1,t) + V ar (c2,t)) .
By the resource constraint C1,t+C2,t = 1, V ar (c1,t) is proportional to V ar (c2,t) .
Thus the optimal monetary policy that maximizes welfare will minimize the
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variance of
c2,t = (1− Γ) dt + Γbt,
where Γ = εB/(εB + 1).
In Appendix B.3 we show that
dt =
χ(R− 1)[φb (ρ− εBβR)− εB(βR + ρ)]
βR2(1 + φb)(χ− ρ)
et.
Thus minimizing the volatility of dividends calls for setting
φb =
εB (βR + ρ)
εBβR− ρ
.
However this policy would raise the volatility of the old bubble because it is
minimized at a different value given in (3.18). Thus optimal monetary policy
trades off between the volatility of dividends and the volatility of the old
bubble.








(R− 1)ρ(φb − εB)
βR(1 + φb)(χ− ρ)
]2
σ2e .
From this equation we can show that the optimal coefficient is given by
φb = εB > 0 for ρ 6= 0. Thus the leaning-against-the-wind policy is opti-
mal. Moreover the optimal coefficient increases with the size of the bubble.
This property is in contrast with Figure 4 of Gaĺı (2014), which shows that
the optimal coefficient φb is positive for a small size of bubbles and becomes
negative for a sufficiently large size of bubbles.
Figure 3·3 illustrates the relation between φb and V ar (c2,t) . The welfare
loss is minimized at φb = 0.875.
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Note: This figure plots the standard deviations of dividend dt and consumption of
the old c2,t for various values of φb. The vertical lines indicate the values of φb that
minimize the standard deviation of consumption and dividend respectively. The
parameter values are β = 1, ε = 6, U = 0.175, φπ = 2, ρ = 0.8, and σ
2
e = 0.01. We
focus on the unstable bubbly steady state with B = 0.1458.
Figure 3·3: Monetary Policy and Welfare
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that Gaĺı’s (2014) counterintuitive results are
driven by his choice of a backward-looking sunspot solution around a stable
bubbly steady state. His model also features a continuum of unstable bubbly
steady states, which Pareto dominate the corresponding stable bubbly steady
states. We extend his model to incorporate persistent bubble shocks. When
deriving the unique forward-looking MSV solution around an unstable bubbly
steady state, we obtain results that are consistent with the conventional views.
We apply learning as a selection device to select steady state and equilibrium.
We find that the unstable bubbly steady state and the associated MSV equi-
librium are E-stable under optimal monetary policy. But the stable bubbly
steady state and the associated sunspot equilibrium are not E-stable under
optimal monetary policy.
In an infinite-horizon framework without recurrent creation of new bub-
bles, Miao and Wang (2018) prove that the economy has two steady states.
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The local equilibrium around the bubbly steady state is unique and the lo-
cal equilibrium around the bubbleless steady state is indeterminate of degree
one. We conjecture that learning will select the bubbly steady state and the
associated forward-looking solution as in this paper. Miao et al. (2015) and
Dong et al. (2020) incorporate recurrent bubbles and show that the economy
has a continuum of bubbly steady states as in Gaĺı (2014). However, they
are unable to prove the stability of these steady states analytically due to the
complexity of their multi-dimensional equilibrium systems. In contrast to Gaĺı
(2014), their numerical results indicate that each bubbly steady state is a sad-
dle point and the local equilibrium around each bubbly steady state is unique.
We suspect that the difference in results may be due to the difference in the
infinite-horizon and overlapping-generations frameworks. Further theoretical
research is needed to understand this issue.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Equilibrium Characterization
Entrepreneurs






divEjt+1 = (1− σE)(qt+1knjt+1 +RtsEjt),
knjt+1 = ajtijt,









0 ≤ ijt ≤ njt,
0 ≤ sEjt ≤ njt.










+λjt+l−1(nt+l−1 − it+l−1) + µjt+l−1it+l−1].
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The first-order-condition regarding ijt is
λt = Et[1− σE + βσE(λt+1 + (1− σE)Rt+1)](qt+1ajt −Rt) + µt.
Since the term before qt+1ajt−Rt is always positive, and under the assumption
Etqt+1a
H > Rt > Etqt+1a
L, I conclude that ijt = njt and s
E
jt = 0 for the high-
type entrepreneurs and ijt = 0 and s
E
jt = njt for the low-type entrepreneurs.
The Bank
The bank maximizes the discounted sum of dividends:





divBt+1 = (1− σB)((Xt −G)Zt+1RX +GRX −RtSt),
Xt = St +Wt
Wt+1 = σ
E((Xt −G)Zt+1RX +GRX −RtSt),
StRt ≤ (Xt −G)ZRX +GRX .








(1− σB)((St+l +Wt+l −G)Zt+1+lRX +GRX −Rt+lSt+l)
+ λt+l((St+l +Wt+l −G)ZRX +GRX −Rt+lSt+l)
]
.
The first-order-condition regarding St is
λt(Rt−ZRX) = Et[1−σB +βσB(λt+1ZRX +(1−σB)Zt+1RX)](Zt+1RX−Rt).
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Notice that under the assumption that Rt−ZRX > 0, λt is always positive as
long as Et(Zt+1R
X −Rt) > 0. As long as the bank is earning a positive profit
margin, the value-at-risk constraint is binding.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In the steady state, the motion of entrepreneurs’ wealth follows
N = σE(qI +RSE).
Substituting for I and SE I obtain
1 = σE(qh+ (1− h)R).









In the steady state, the first-order-condition for final-good producers with
respect to qt becomes









Therefore Y is decreasing in q and the convenience yield CY .
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A.3 Equilibrium System
The equilibrium dynamic system consists of the following 14 equations.
It = hNt,
Knt = It−1,
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +Knt ,
SE = (1− h)Nt,
0 = (Xt−1 −G)ZRX +GRX −Rt−1St−1,
Xt = St +Wt,
Wt = σ




























wt = (1− α)Kαt ,
qt = αK
α−1




Here divEt = (1− σE)(qtKnt + Rt−1SEt−1), divBt = (1− σb)((Xt−1 − G)ZtRX +
GRX −Rt−1St−1) and Πt = Yt − wtLt − qtKnt .
A.4 Shortage of Safe Assets Due to Worse Investment
Opportunities
A shortage of safe assets can arise from a worsening of investment efficiency
of the entrepreneurs. When the economy has relative more low-type en-
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trepreneurs than the high-type, the demand for safe assets as a store of value
will be larger, and hence leads to a shortage of safe assets. Figure A·1 shows the
transition path of the model economy under a permanent decrease of h, the
measure of high-type entrepreneurs. More low-type entrepreneurs increases
the demand for safe assets, generating a shortage of safe assets with a higher
convenience yield. Although the total wealth of entrepreneurs increases, it
does not cover the drop in the proportion of high-type and hence the total
investment and output decrease. In response to the shortage of safe assets,
the bank expands its balance sheet and produces more private safe assets.
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Figure A·1: Transition Path under a Permanent Decrease in
the Measure of High-Type Entrepreneurs
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Deriving Equilibrium Bubble Dynamics
As in Gaĺı’ (2014), the log-linearize equilibrium system consists equations
(3.19), (3.20), and
0 = c1,t + βRc2,t, (B.1)
c1,t = Etc2,t+1 − rt, (B.2)
c2,t = (1− Γ)dt + Γbt, (B.3)
Et−1wt = Et−1dt = 0, (B.4)
rt = φππt + φbqt. (B.5)
Combining (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3) we derive
rt = (1− Γ)Etdt+1 + ΓEtbt+1 + βR((1− Γ)dt + Γbt)
= ΓEtbt+1 + βR((1− Γ)dt + Γbt),
where we have used Etdt+1 = 0 by (B.4) in the second equality.
Combining the equation above with (3.19) and (3.20) yields
rt = Γ(rt +Rbt + (1−R)ut) + βR((1− Γ)dt + Γbt).
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We substitute Γ = εB/(εB + 1) into the equation above to obtain
rt = εBR(1 + β)bt + εB(1−R)ut + βRdt. (B.6)
Taking expectations conditional on information at time t− 1 yields
Et−1rt = εBR(1 + β)Et−1bt + εB(1−R)Et−1ut, (B.7)
where we have used Et−1dt = 0. We use equation (B.7) and interest rate rule
(B.5) to derive
rt − Et−1rt = φπ(πt − Et−1πt) + φb(qt − Et−1qt)
= φb(qt − Et−1qt)
= φbR(bt − Et−1bt) + φb(1−R)(ut − Et−1ut), (B.8)
where the second equality follows from πt = Et−1πt due to price stickiness and
we use (3.19) to substitute for qt to derive the third equality.
Using (B.7) and (B.8) we derive
rt = rt − Et−1rt + Et−1rt
= φbRbt + (εB(1 + β)− φb)REt−1bt + φb(1−R)ut
+ (εB − φb)(1−R)Et−1ut.
Now we substitute the equation above into (3.20) and use (3.19) to derive
Etbt+1 = Rbt + (1−R)ut + φbRbt
− (φb − εB(1 + β))REt−1bt + φb(1−R)ut − (φb − εB)(1−R)Et−1ut
= (φb + 1)Rbt − (φb − εB(1 + β))REt−1bt + (φb + 1)(1−R)ut
− (φb − εB)(1−R)Et−1ut.
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We then obtain (3.13). Q.E.D.
B.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Conjecture that the solution takes the form
bt = ϕ0bt−1 + ϕ1ut−2 + ϕ2et + ϕ3et−1 + ϕ4ξt + ϕ5ξt−1,
where ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4, and ϕ5 are coefficients to be determined. Substituting




[ϕ0bt + ϕ1ut−1 + ϕ3et + ϕ5ξt]
+
φb − εB(1 + β)
φb + 1




(ρut−1 + et) +







[ϕ0 (ϕ0bt−1 + ϕ1ut−2 + ϕ2et + ϕ3et−1 + ϕ4ξt + ϕ5ξt−1)
+ϕ1 (ρut−2 + et−1) + ϕ3et + ϕ5ξt]
+
φb − εB(1 + β)
φb + 1





ρ2ut−2 + ρet−1 + et
)
+


















(ϕ0ϕ1 + ρϕ1) +




















(ϕ0ϕ3 + ϕ1) +


















φb − εB(1 + β)
φb + 1
. (B.14)
There are two solutions for ϕ0 : ϕ0 = 0 and
ϕ0 = χ = R (1 + εB (1 + β)) .
In a neighborhood of the stable bubbly steady state, we have χ ∈ (0, 1). The
only stationary solution must corresponds to ϕ0 = χ as Gaĺı (2014) points out.
We can then solve for the other coefficients:
ϕ1 = (1−R) (1 + εB) ρ, ϕ2 =
ϕ3 + (R− 1) (1 + φb)
R (φb + 1)− χ
, ϕ4 =
ϕ5
R(φb + 1)− χ
,
and ϕ3 and ϕ5 are arbitrary numbers. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2: We take expectations conditional on information
at time t− 1 on both sides of (3.13) to obtain
Et−1bt
[



















R[1 + εB(1 + β)]
Et−1bt+1 −
(1−R)(εB + 1)
R(1 + εB(1 + β))
ρut−1.
By iterating the equation above forward we can derive
Et−1bt = −
(1−R)(εB + 1)
R(1 + εB(1 + β))
(
1
1− ρ/R[1 + εB(1 + β)]
)
ρut−1
= −(1−R)(εB + 1)
χ− ρ
ρut−1,








Substituting the preceding expressions for Etbt+1 and Et−1bt into (3.13), we
obtain the rational expectations solution in (3.16). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: We use lifetime utility as the welfare criterion.
Define the steady state welfare as
Wf ≡ ln(C1) + β ln(C2),
where C1 and C2 denote the steady-state consumption of a consumer in his



















Denote B∗ ≡ 1/M − 1/(1 + β). Note that B∗ > 0 under the condition
M < 1 + β. This implies that welfare is increasing with B when B < B∗. As
shown in Gaĺı (2014) Lemma 1, for any U ∈ (0, Ū) the model has two bubbly
steady states. Moreover the stable one Bs is always less than the unstable one
Bu. Thus to show the welfare is greater at Bu than at Bs, it suffices to show
that Bu < B
∗.
Since Bu is the larger root of equation H(B,U) = B, we have
Bu =
−(1 + U − 1+βM ) +
√







(1− U − 1+βM ) +
√





Note that 1 − U − 1+βM < 0 by (3.12). To show Bu < B
∗, it suffices to show
that
(1− U − 1 + β
M
)2 > (1 + U − 1 + β
M
)2 − 4(1 + β)(1− 1
M
)U.
This inequality is equivalent to 4(1 +β)U > 4U, which holds true since U, β >
0.
To study E-stability, we rewrite (3.13) in a general form














ρ(εB − φb)(R− 1)
(φb + 1)R
.
We can check that χ ≡ R(1 + εB(1 + β)) = β−11 (1 − β0). Suppose that the
PLM is bt = a. Set Et−1bt = Etbt+1 = a and ut = ut−1 = 0. Then the
ALM is bt = T (a) = (β0 + β1) a. By Evans and Honkapohja (2012), the E-
stability condition for the steady state a = 0 given the ODE ȧ = T (a)− a =
(β0 + β1) a−a is β0 +β1 < 1. Since χ > 1 for the unstable bubbly steady state
and χ ∈ (0, 1) for the stable bubbly steady state, we immediately establish
the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: We start with the MSV solution. We write the
PLM as
bt = µ+ ϕ1ut−1 + ϕ2et,
where we include a constant term µ. Stability under learning requires µ con-
vergence of µ to zero. Plugging this equation into (B.15) we obtain the ALM
with the map T (µ, ϕ1, ϕ2) . By Evans and Honkapohja (2012), the E-stability
condition is
β0 + β1 < 1, β0 + β1ρ < 1. (B.16)
Using the definition in the proof of Proposition 3.3, we have
β0 + β1 =






β0 + ρβ1 =







Since χ > 1 at the unstable bubbly steady state, the E-stability condition for
the MSV solution is φb > −1.
Now we consider the backward sunspot solution. We write PLM as
bt = µ+ ϕ1bt−1 + ϕ2ut−1 + ϕ3et + ϕ4et−1 + ϕ5ξt + ϕ6ξt−1.
Plugging this equation into (B.15) we obtain the ALM with the T−map. By
Evans and Honkapohja (2012), the E-stability condition is β0 > 1, β1 < 0.
Also the stationarity of the solution requires |β−11 (1−β0)| < 1. In terms of our
model parameters, the E-stability condition is φb < −1. Q.E.D.
B.3 Deriving MSV Equilibrium
From Proposition 3.2 we have the forward-looking MSV solution for the old
bubble:
bt =











We use this solution to derive solutions for other variables in the model. By
(3.19) we obtain the solution for qt:
qt = Rbt + (1−R)ut
= (1−R)
[
1− R(εB + 1)
χ− ρ
]
ρut−1 + (R− 1)
[
ρ(1 + εB)
(φb + 1)(χ− ρ)
]
et. (B.18)
By (3.20) we obtain the solution for rt:








φbρ(R− 1)(εB + 1)
(φb + 1)(χ− ρ)
et. (B.19)
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By (B.5) we obtain the solution for πt:
πt =
(R− 1)[(εB + 1)ρ+ (φb + 1)(εBRβ − ρ)]
φπ(χ− ρ)
ρut−1.
Substituting (B.19) and (B.17) into (B.5) we obtain the solution for dt:
dt =
χ(R− 1)[φbρ− εB(βR(1 + φb) + ρ)]
βR2(1 + φb)(χ− ρ)
et.
By (B.3) we obtain the solution for c2,t:





ρ(R− 1)(φb − εB)
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